

Islam in Modern Indonesia

**February 7, 2002
Washington, D.C.**

**A Joint Conference Sponsored by
The United States-Indonesia Society and
The Asia Foundation**

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A joint USINDO-Asia Foundation Conference

Islam in Modern Indonesia

Thursday, February 7, 2002

St. Regis Hotel Ballroom, 16th & K St. NW, Washington, D.C.

Agenda

8:30 – 8:55 am Registration

9:00 – 9:10 am Welcome remarks

SESSION I: Indonesian Islam in a World Context

9:15 – 10:45 am Speakers: **Azyumardi Azra** – Rector, State Institute for Islamic Studies (IAIN)

Mark Woodward – Professor of Religious Studies, Arizona State University

Robert W. Hefner – Professor of Anthropology and Associate Director of the Institute for the Study of Economic Culture, Boston University

Discussion followed by Coffee Break

SESSION II: The Politics of Islam in a Democratizing Indonesia

11:00 – 12:30 pm Speakers: **Ulil Abshar Abdalla** – Executive Director, Indonesia Conference on Religion and Peace (ICRP)

Lies Marcoes Natsir – Researcher, Association for the Development of Pesantren and Society (P3M)

Greg Fealy – Lecturer in Southeast Asian Politics and History, Australian National University

Discussion

LUNCH

12:35 – 1:55 pm Speaker: **Douglas Ramage** – Representative, The Asia Foundation, Jakarta

SESSION III: Indonesian Reactions to the September 11 Terrorist Attacks, Extremism and U.S.-Indonesia Relations

2:00 – 3:30 pm Speakers: **Moeslim Abdurrahman**, Board of Directors, Muhammadiyah

Rizal Sukma- Director of Studies, Center for Strategic and International Studies (CSIS)

Donald K. Emmerson – Senior Fellow, Stanford University Asia/Pacific Research Center

Discussion

3:45 – 4:00 pm Closing Remarks

EXECUTIVE SUMMARY

Five Indonesians, four Americans and one Australian convened on February 7, 2002 to examine the history, the international connections and the politics of Islam in Indonesia. There was a remarkable consensus among the speakers on the key conclusions, with several of the following points being made by more than one person:

- The increase in Islamic radicalism is due basically to the “abrupt decline of central government authority together with the demoralization of the police.” There is no conspiracy at the center directing radical groups but rather a breakdown in governance at the center and an inability or unwillingness to prevent the excesses of individual players.
- The vast majority of Indonesian Muslims remain tolerant and inclusive, as they have been traditionally described, and voted for secular political parties in the last elections in June 1999. Although Islamic piety has increased in recent years there has been no increase in the number of radical Muslims.
- There has always been tension between the majority view and small groups that have pushed for more orthodox, conservative, literal interpretations of Islam. These more conservative groups have been mostly indigenous although there have always been ties between Indonesian Muslims and Muslims elsewhere. These groups have had varying agendas and varying degrees of activism. International connections are not necessarily terrorist connections.
- The presence of al Qaeda in Indonesia has not been proven. However intelligence reports about the activities of individuals in various Southeast Asia countries are credible and should be investigated cooperatively among those countries.
- The Laskar Jihad is the most flamboyant and militant of the Islamic organizations. There is ample reason to presume it receives its funding from internal sources, including individuals from the former elite of the New Order who have vast sums of money at their disposal.
- The Islamic-oriented political parties are in disarray and are ineffective. There is no likelihood that any legislation would succeed in requiring Muslims to observe Islamic (Shariah) Law. There is no likelihood of Indonesia becoming an Islamic State. Islamic politics is less about doctrine than about power struggles of individuals and groups seeking to maintain their positions.
- Democratization will not proceed in Indonesia until it is actively supported by the Islamic community and until the values of democracy are explicitly articulated as compatible with Islamic doctrine.
- Civil society, however important, will not create a democracy unless it is linked to state institutions and reinforced by actions of the government.
- Despite its relatively small size, Islamic radicalism in Indonesia poses a danger because it may co-opt the moderate majority in the absence of effective counter measures.
- The United States should not over emphasize the threat of radical groups in Indonesia because it will give them the publicity they seek, enable them to play the “nationalist” card, provoke a negative reaction among moderates and increase bilateral tension.
- The best way for the United States to counter radicalism will be to continue assistance to democracy-building institutions and continue support for economic recovery.

- The United States should help the police in training to maintain law and order, and should look toward increased military to military relations within the bounds of current U.S. law.

SESSION I – Indonesian Islam in a World Context

Azyumardi Azra, rector of the State Institute for Islamic Studies (IAIN), said it is “simplistic” to think of Indonesian Islam as the same as Islam in the Middle East. Because of its slow, peaceful penetration over centuries, accommodating to and integrating with local beliefs and customs, and because of the less rigid structure of Indonesian traditional society (including the active role of women in public life), the conventional wisdom of Indonesian Islam as tolerant, inclusive and inherently compatible with democracy is valid.

The head of Indonesia’s most venerable state institution to promote liberal Islamic studies and to integrate religious and secular education in the country, Professor Azra associated the most democratizing Muslim countries, as listed by Freedom House in New York, as being the “least Arabicized.” (Freedom House listed Indonesia along with Bangladesh, Nigeria and Iran.)

Nevertheless, Indonesia has experienced indigenous radical groups since independence that wanted to establish an Islamic state, the most famous being the Darul Islam, which operated from the mid 1950s until 1962. Professor Azra said that some other groups, which operated during the Soeharto period “were believed to have been engineered by certain army generals in order to discredit Islam.” These radical groups failed because they were crushed by the army and also because they “failed to gain support from mainstream Muslims.”

This persistent but minor thread in Indonesia’s Muslim community has emerged again because of the power vacuum after the fall of Soeharto, and more recently the ouster of President Wahid (Gus Dur). Many are new groups that were unknown before, and no exact account exists, but “there are reports...their leadership have been close to certain army generals [and] some observers assert that they have been sponsored, or at least helped, by certain circles of the Indonesian military.” He said it is “conspicuously clear” that these groups are led by people of Arab, particularly Yemeni, origin. He gave as examples Habib Rizq Shihab, leader of the FPI (Islamic Defense Group), Jafar Umar Thalib, leader of the Laskar Jihad, Abu Bakar Baasyir of the MMI (Indonesian Council of Jihad Fighters) and Habib Husen al-Habsyi, leader of the JAMI (Jamaah al-Ikhwan al-Muslimin Indonesia).

These groups share a literal interpretation of Islam and claim that Muslims should practice only “pure” Islam as practiced by the Prophet Muhammad and his companions, or *Salaf*. They can thus be included among Salafi activist movements that attack discotheques and other “places of violence.” They also take a militant view of *jihad* as “holy war” against perceived enemies of Islam rather than the mainstream view of *jihad* as meaning “exerting oneself to the utmost” in Muslim activities, with war as a last resort.

Professor Azra listed other groups as well, in existence since the Soeharto period, that were less radical. Of these the most important is the Hizb al-Tahrir (Party of Liberation) established in Lebanon and first introduced in Indonesia in 1972. Its objective is to re-establish the Caliphate, a

universal Islamic political entity, as the most effective way to achieve Muslim unity. This group has been active in mass demonstrations against the U.S. after the start of its military operations in Afghanistan. Despite increased visibility Professor Azra quoted its leader as saying the membership has not increased.

All radical groups have some connections with theological or organizational groups elsewhere, including the Middle East, but it is difficult to establish a connection with al Qaeda. According to Professor Azra, the leaders of the FPI, Laskar Jihad and JAMI have criticized Osama bin Laden.

However, the MMI, led by Abu Bakar Baasyir is known to have close links with the KMMM, Malaysian Military Muslim Group. Baasyir fled to Malaysia to escape Soeharto repression and returned after the fall of Soeharto. He is associated with the Jamaah Islamiyyah which has alleged links to al Qaeda. Professor Azra acknowledged a much deeper investigation into these links, involving all of the ASEAN governments, is needed.

The increase in radicalism of these groups is basically the outcome of the “government failure to enforce the law and solve...social ills such as ethno-religious conflicts, increased crime, rampant corruption, widespread drug abuse and the like,” and the “abrupt decline of central government authority together with the demoralization of the police.”

Meanwhile, he said, the largest mainstream Muslim organizations, the Nahdlatul Ulama and the Muhammadiyah, have been overshadowed by media attention to radical groups. Since November, however, they have become more assertive, and have recently agreed to carry out joint activities to combat extremism. Both leaders, Hasyim Muzadi of NU and Ahmad Syafii Maarif of Muhammadiyah, appealed to the government to take harsh measures against lawbreakers.

President Megawati, after a slow response to Muslim hardliners, is beginning to take a firmer policy.

The United States should not overemphasize the threat of radical groups, thereby giving them the publicity they seek and alienating mainstream Muslims. This excessive attention could provoke a reaction, bringing moderates closer to radicals and creating a momentum to challenge Megawati’s presidency, thus adding to Indonesian political instability.

Mark Woodward, a professor of religious studies at Arizona State University and an authority on modern religion and ethnicity in Indonesia, focused his remarks on the international nature of Islam and the moderate as well as radical ties among Muslims, and the great variety of cultures within Islam.

He pointed out that although Islam originated in Arabia it is not synonymous with Arabian culture, and he quoted Gus Dur as having said “The Saudis don’t understand the difference between Islam and their own culture.”

Until the rise of the conservative Wahabi movement in the 18th century, Mecca was the center of a lively international congregation of scholars, including some from what is now Indonesia. He noted that the connections between the Middle East and Southeast Asia especially included Yemen, and he pointed out that not all Yemenis were necessarily radical, citing the family of Ali Alatas, former Indonesian foreign minister, as originally from Yemen.

He further noted that the well-established international connections of Indonesian Muslims include but are not limited to Saudi Arabia. Those students in various universities in Saudi Arabia lean toward the strict, literal tradition of Wahabi Islam. A large number of Indonesian students are studying Islam in Cairo, at al Azhar University. These students are mostly associated with the Nahdlatul Ulama and are associated in dialogue with leading liberal intellectuals in the Middle East. A third group studies in the United States and other Western institutions such as McGill, Australian National University and others. He noted that Indonesia's leading moderate Islamic scholar, Nurcholish Madjid, has a PhD from the University of Chicago, as well as the conservative Muslim politician Amien Rais, chairman of the Peoples' Consultative Assembly.

Robert Hefner, a leading scholar on Indonesian Islam, has most recently conducted research on radical groups including the Laskar Jihad.

He presented a very somber view of the state of liberal Islam in Indonesia, all the more somber because he viewed Indonesia during the last years of the Soeharto New Order as one of the "most vibrant centers for new Muslim political thinking the modern world has seen." This was not just intellectuals, but a "lively coalition" linking leaders and mass-based institutions. He credited these efforts with assembling the ingredients essential to creating a lasting Muslim democracy: thoughtful articulation of policy that is justified under religious doctrine, and a link between respected intellectuals and mass-based organizations.

This promise was betrayed by events after the fall of Soeharto, he said. He cited the failure of governance as the primary cause for the rise of radical groups, and said this failure was primarily due to the lasting influence of the cronies of the old regime, who have vast sums of money at their disposal.

The coalition that brought about Soeharto's resignation quickly fell apart after his departure into diverse alliances of Islamist and secular nationalist groupings. Moreover, most of the old elite remained in positions of power. Rather than simply uniting to oppose reform, however, political elites reached out, at national and local levels, to various groupings to create expedient alliances to remain in power. In a vacuum of central power these rivalries flourished, resulting in ethnoreligious tensions and clashes. In some areas, such as Yogyakarta and East Kalimantan, these rivalries were kept within civil bounds by local governments; but in Maluku, Central Kalimantan, Poso (Central Sulawesi) and a few other regions the conflicts got out of hand.

Moreover, the rival elites brought into play "another category of social actor" known since colonial times but which became more prominent at the end of the Soeharto era: the "organized political-cum-criminal syndicates known as *preman*." These gangster groups usually adopted the ideology of their patrons to assume an air of public service, and by the end of the New Order the

popular ideology was Islam. This set the stage for gang warfare between Islamist, Christian and nationalist groups.

It is important in evaluating events in Indonesia since September 11 not to exaggerate the strength of radical Islamism and overlook the role of “simple patronage and extralegal competition,” he said.

The elections of June 1999 showed that most voters favored secular or moderate Islamist political parties, in fact by a larger majority than in the only other free and open general elections, held in 1955. “Only about 16 percent of the vote went to parties advocating (conservative Islamic) programs...as opposed to more than 40 percent in 1955.”

At the same time, he said, most social indicators show that the populace is becoming more observant of Islamic customs. This increased piety has not resulted in more conservative voting. It is not Islam that is destabilizing Indonesia, he said, but “a breakdown of governance exacerbated by elite factionalism and the willingness of ...elites to take advantage of ethnoreligious tensions for their own purposes.”

There is no conspiracy at the center to control these radical groups, he said, but rather a collapse at the center and an inability or unwillingness to prevent the excesses of individual players.

In this context, Professor Hefner discussed two organizations, MMI (Indonesian Mujahidin Council) and Laskar Jihad, as “heirs to a tradition of radical politics and religion that...has always operated on the fringe of Indonesian society.”

MMI was founded in August 2000 and its spiritual leader, Abu Bakar Ba’asyir, served prison time in the late 1970s for his opposition to Soeharto. He remained a strong critic of Soeharto and also of the army. Ba’asyir is accused by Malaysian and Philippine intelligence sources as leader of *Jemaah Islamiyah*, which these sources say has ties to al Qaeda. He is unlikely to have any support from the Indonesian armed forces, according to Professor Hefner.

The Laskar Jihad, on the other hand, is “long thought to enjoy the patronage of a small but significant faction of the armed forces.” It grew out of a conservative religious movement founded in the early 1990s by Jafar Umar Thalib. It is distinguished from other conservative movements in the “firm belief that the United States and Israel are leading a world-wide conspiracy to destroy Islam.” Jafar’s fiery sermons stress the need for *jihad* to cleanse society of un-Islamic influences. Importantly also, his concepts include the stipulation that unbelievers in Indonesia must accept the role of protected minorities and not be allowed to exercise authority over Muslims. Jafar has made clear that “he believes that the equal citizenship sanctioned by the Indonesian constitution is utterly antithetical to Islam.”

The possible connections between the Laskar Jihad and al Qaeda are not clear. Laskar Jihad has strongly denied receiving any funds from Osama bin Laden. However, Indonesian intelligence chief General Hendropriyono confirmed reports of al Qaeda training camps in Indonesia to assist Laskar Jihad fighters in Maluku and Central Sulawesi. Hendropriyono was strongly criticized by other conservative Muslims, for presumably looking for an excuse for action against radical

Islamic groups. He subsequently backed away from his assertion. This did not illustrate the truth of the matter but instead the conflicting views among the security and political elite.

In any case there is ample evidence that Laskar Jihad enjoys considerable domestic financial support, according to Hefner. He quotes a former field commander of Laskar Jihad who told him that in January 2000 Jafar “was approached” by military retirees with the message that they approved of his plans to escalate the armed campaign against Christians in Maluku. The purpose was explicitly stated: “to undermine the reform government of Abdurrahman Wahid.” In fact, the Laskar Jihad was subsequently able to arm and transport its fighters from Java to Maluku without any challenge, despite the fact that President Wahid and other government leaders appealed to security officials to stop the militia from traveling.

Hefner stated that these radical groups, although operating with the collusion of certain officials, still do not represent the views of the majority, who are uneasy with violence and yearn for politics that are moderate and inclusive. However, the outcome will depend on how effective will be the efforts of President Megawati, the mainstream Muslim leadership and moderate elements in the armed forces. They must forge a working consensus between civil society and the government to combat extremist and divisive elements.

SESSION II – The Politics of Islam in a Democratizing Indonesia

Ulil Abshar Abdalla is executive director of the Indonesia Conference on Religion and Peace, an organization associated with the Nahdlatul Ulama, one of the two largest Muslim organizations in Indonesia. He is cheerfully optimistic about the prospects of incorporating democratic and modernist notions, such as openness, pluralism, gender equality and the like, into the theological framework of Islam. He reiterated the point made by speakers in the first session that this explicit ideological support is necessary and that democracy will not really take root in Indonesia without the strong support of the Islamic society. Thus active efforts toward democratization are required from the moderate Muslim community.

Mr. Ulil described discussion circles, a radio talk show, a weekly newspaper column and a journal, all designed to promote dialogue among liberal (a term he acknowledges as “controversial”), moderate and radical elements of the Muslim community.

He said that radicals such as Jafar Umar Thalib and Habib Rizq are not as radical as people think, and that they seem to be amenable to these conciliation efforts. He said the Laskar Jihad was “responding” to the attack on Muslims in Maluku, and that this group as well as the Islamic Defense Group (FPI) share the notion of a nation state of Indonesia and are not pressing for an Islamic state. They believe, however, that Muslims were treated unfairly under Soeharto and want to be treated as the majority that they represent in the population.

While they wish to have *shariah* (Islamic) law implemented for Muslims, Ulil said there is no clear consensus and therefore “room for dialogue” on what *shariah* law implies.

Lies Marcoes Natsir, a researcher with the Association for the Development of Pesantren and Society (P3M), described the work of her organization to promote the rights of women in an Islamic society, a goal that is relevant because Islam prescribes relationships between men and women. She said the Western notion of Islam being repressive toward women because of such injunctions as requiring women to “wear the veil” and restricting their public role seems “peculiar to us” because the repression of women is not limited to Islam. She said it has less to do with theology than simple “male political tactics.” As an example she discussed the development of ideas in Indonesia regarding the acceptability of a woman as a political leader. A decree issued by the Nahdlatul Ulama in 1997 stating that there was no prohibition for a woman to be head of state was later retracted, she said, because the original decree was linked to the promotion of Soeharto’s daughter Tutut as a potential political candidate. After Tutut’s prospects dissolved with the resignation of her father and before Megawati became vice president, most Islamic organizations again rejected the idea of a woman as head of state. However, after the disillusionment with Gus Dur this opposition to Megawati declined somewhat and in August 2001 the Muhammadiyah organization decreed that there was no obstacle to a woman as head of state. At a recent Muhammadiyah Congress in Bali it was agreed that a woman may be elected as leader of that organization.

Ms. Lies described the activities of her NGO in the advocacy for women’s rights within Islam, specifically in the 10,000 *pesantren* or Islamic boarding schools spread across Java and Madura, where more than 70 percent of the entire Indonesian Muslim population lives. Most of the *pesantren* are affiliated with the Nahdlatul Ulama, one of the two biggest Muslim organizations, located mostly in rural areas, and the one considered the more traditional though tolerant. Her organization focuses especially on reproductive and political (both domestic and public) rights.

The second largest Muslim organization, Muhammadiyah, also has a women’s affiliate that has established a network of vocational education centers and programs for women in development especially in the fields of education, health and small-scale finance.

Asked whether Western pressure for human rights is helpful to organizations such as hers, Ms. Lies answered that it is “somehow bad” because it causes confrontation between Islam and the West and, she implied, complicates their efforts.

Greg Fealy is a lecturer in Southeast Asian politics and history at Australian National University and a student of political parties in Indonesia. He sees today’s parties as much degraded from parties that were prominent during the parliamentary democracy period of the 1950s. Taking a closer look at the leading five Islamic political parties, he finds them sorely lacking in the qualities that make an effective organization. “Islamic parties are more divided now than at any time in history since 1945,” he said.

Politics of the 1950s have been “dismissed,” he said, but he sees important insights in comparing political parties of that period with today:

- Individuals are more powerful now. There is something almost “cultic, iconic” about present day party leaders, who have little connection with their organizations.

- The demise of ideology. Parties in the 1950s had conferences and heated debates on particular issues. There are few party platforms today.
- Physical intimidation. No party in the 1950s had a paramilitary wing. Now every party has an auxiliary organization, from well-trained cadres to ordinary hooligans.
- Money politics. Outright buying of public or party position is much more common today.

He examined the five leading Islamic political parties according to their share of the vote in the 1999 elections. They are the PKB (Gus Dur's party), with 12.6 percent of the vote, the United Development Party (PPP, the party of the vice president Hamzah Haz), 11.7 percent; the National Mandate Party (PAN, the party of Amien Rais), at 7.4 percent, Crescent Star (Bulan Bintang, the party of Yusril Mahendra), at 1.9 percent, and the Justice Party (Partai Keadilaan) at 1.7 percent.

He chose four indicators of future effectiveness and looked at the above parties in this light. They are branch activities, leaders arising from the cadres, internal communication between the elites and the grass roots localities, and coherent party platforms.

Most Islamic parties are doing poorly, according to his conclusions:

- Most are "election only" parties and are moribund at the branch level. There are a very small number of elites.
- Party cadres are not emerging. In most cases money will buy a party post, except for the Partai Keadilaan which has rigorous rules and leaders who are not wealthy.
- Communication is poor within organizations and little value is given to grassroots opinion.
- Few parties had a platform in 1999 and little work has been done since on issues.

Fragmentation is a serious issue. There have been serious splits in four of the five parties, with the exception of Partai Keadilaan. Leadership has been keenly disappointing, illustrated by the disastrous performance of Gus Dur and the contradictions of Amien Rais. Ideology is "hollow." The two most doctrinaire parties, PPP and Bulan Bintang, focus on the Jakarta Charter, a proposition that was defeated in the 1945 Constitution that held that Muslims must follow *shariah* law. However, no attempt has been made to define *shariah* law. This basic issue has not been worked out.

In answer to a question Mr. Fealy cautioned whether a reform of the electoral system would produce more coherent political parties and more accountability. He said there are "enormous barriers" to installing a district system that might require four or five years to carry out. He warned that in the end, if not properly implemented, an ineffective system might lead to violence.

As for constitutional reform, he said the core problem of government in Indonesia is not caused by a struggle between a presidential and a parliamentary system, but a lack of leaders' decisions and implementation. The problem is more cultural than constitutional, he said.

LUNCHEON ADDRESS – Indonesian Reactions to the September 11 Terrorist Attacks

Douglas Ramage, Representative to Indonesia, The Asia Foundation, described the reaction of Indonesians to the September 11 attacks in the United States and the subsequent sequence of events that led to a temporary rise in anti-American sentiment.

The immediate Indonesian reaction was one of sympathy, he said, and was swift and spontaneous. During President Megawati's visit to the United States shortly after the attacks she expressed this sympathy and support.

However, before long there was speculation in Indonesia on why the attacks occurred, and several expressions that they were the result of a wrong-headed American policy in the Middle East.

The Indonesian media played a role in exacerbating the resulting tensions by publishing unsubstantiated speculation on the reasons for September 11 and vitriolic attacks on the U.S. It was the first evidence of the downside of the Indonesian free press, which is truly unregulated, privately owned, and for profit.

By the end of September the issue had become politicized. "It was the opening salvo of the 2004 election campaign," according to one Golkar member. President Megawati was shocked by attacks from the right on her Islamic credentials, for expressing support of the United States, and from the left from nationalists who criticized her speech in Houston, Texas inviting American business to come to Indonesia. She was considered a "lackey of the Americans" by both groups. Small radical Islamic groups demonstrated at the U.S. embassy and threatened "sweeps" of American tourists from hotels.

It was a serious matter for her. She leads a weak government and must thread her way between the nationalist left and the Islamic right. She dealt with it by a speech on the eve of a prominent Muslim holiday in which she criticized the spilling of blood to avenge the spilling of blood. Without naming names, she distanced herself from the United States and particularly from the U.S. campaign in Afghanistan, which had begun by then.

The domestic reaction to this speech was interesting. The criticism began to subside, perhaps in part due to some publicity about the joy in Afghanistan shown by those liberated from the Taliban.

Eventually public attention returned to normal preoccupations, such as local scandals and it was politics as usual. The government deployed security forces to protect the embassy, and mainstream Muslims, including the head of Muhammadiyah, shocked by the earlier vitriol, began to speak out. Pragmatic nationalism reasserted itself. Megawati has something of a Teflon quality and seems to have emerged unscathed. Most political parties are divided by internal wrangling and are unable to maintain any momentum in attacks against her.

However, the criticisms of the U.S. touched a chord. Indonesian objections to U.S. Mid-East policy is widespread, and now can be freely expressed in the press. There is a genuine rejection of unilateralism. But these feelings are not strong or deep-seated, so the affair did not progress to widespread anti-Americanism.

But why were those who threatened U.S. citizens not punished? Impunity is the most intractable problem in Indonesia. No one is ever punished. It may be latent sympathy with the views articulated by radicals, or fear of further domestic consequences; but one should not underestimate the possibility of simple incompetence and weak government institutions.

SESSION III – Indonesian Reactions to September 11, Extremism and U.S.-Indonesian Relations

Moeslim Abdurrahman, a member of Muhammadiyah's board of directors, further described the aftermath of September 11 in Indonesia, and gave examples of some of the popular and common anti-American rhetoric that increased during this period.

He reported that in the *hudpah* (the Friday sermon after prayers in the mosques), audiences were frequently reminded to be more careful of the international conspiracy of the United States and Jews to suppress Muslim countries like Indonesia. According to this view, this conspiracy is actually behind the economic crisis, so [wealthy] Christian missionaries can benefit from poverty and convert Muslims by providing rice. He described other examples of response, some equally ominous and some quite frivolous, such as the selling of Osama bin Laden tee shirts, which, he said, did not mean support for bin Laden but was just a temporary fad. The moderates, who were mostly silent, do not have a culture of speaking out as do the radicals, he said.

This variety of Islamic reaction demonstrates that it is difficult to generalize about Islam in Indonesia. Most people are ill informed and confused about international issues like globalization and U.S. foreign policy and are still figuring out issues like the meaning of gender, democracy etc.

But foreign observers should not underestimate the importance of community and the strength of civil organizations in the communitarian religion of Islam. The Muhammadiyah and the Nahdlatul Ulama have thousands of universities, hospitals, and other institutions, all outside the state. This represents a strong civil society, and in cases of local need, e.g. floods, the local communities are more effective than government.

Rizal Sukma, director of studies at the Centre for Strategic and International Studies, is a member of Muhammadiyah and comes from Aceh. He described his reactions to September 11, ranging from puzzlement that Indonesians would criticize the victims of the attack in saying it happened "because the Americans were arrogant" and anger when the U.S. responded with the bombing of Afghanistan. He was angry that, while there has been great discussion about "collateral damage" in other conflicts, i.e. the number of Palestinians killed or the number of Afghans killed, there is no interest in the number of Acehnese being killed in the current conflict there.

He said in Indonesia the reaction to September 11 is understood as a test for the Megawati government: would it stand the test of not being co-opted by the United States? This is typical of any post-colonial state, he said.

He added that the objections to the U.S. military campaign also reflect a strain of opinion opposing military force to deal with terrorism, a view that springs from Indonesian experience. (However that view disappeared with the fall of the Taliban, he said.)

He said radical Islam comes from several sources in Indonesia: moral frustration, ideological fear of globalization and Western domination, a desire for a *Pax Islamica* in Indonesia, simple political opportunism, and economic and social resentments. It is a phenomenon not found outside Java, he said, and is urban-based.

Today's radicals grew up in the 1970s and 1980s, at the height of Soeharto's New Order. They are motivated by various factors, he said: the urge to taste power in the vacuum after the Soeharto regime; weak law enforcement by government; and economic hardship. There are now 40 million people unemployed, he noted, and 1.3 million internally displaced people (IDP), refugees from ethnic and religious conflicts.

The failure of military reform plays into this game, he said. The police, now in charge of internal security, claim they cannot enforce law and order because they are constrained by possible human rights violations.

What can the United States do? Rizal recommended that the U.S. should continue to assist economic development and not allow the war on terrorism to derail pro-democracy movements in Aceh, Papua and other places. Better public democracy is also needed: the U.S. is not doing much to explain in Indonesia what is going on in the United States.

Donald Emmerson, senior fellow at Standord University's Asia/Pacific Research Center, noted some provocative ambiguities and ironies in American policy.

- American activism

The upsurge in American patriotism after September 11, and the explicit pride in establishing global democratic projects, are not much different than Islamism in terms of loyal fervor and proselytization.

The notion that people everywhere can achieve self-government under the rule of law might be seen as a "hyper-Wilsonian invitation" to secession.

"Let's roll!" has been cried too many times; as if all we have to do is act. What is needed is time, for long-term solutions. American impatience will be a problem.

- Leverage

It's a question whether Indonesia is better off when the U.S. wants something or when there is no immediate national motive. American indifference versus American obsession presumes an asymmetrical relationship between the two countries. Indonesia needs the United States for many things. If the United States needs something from Indonesia, does that suggest Indonesia has some leverage?

Meanwhile, the U.S. "obsession" is not entirely unwarranted. The U.S. vulnerability to terrorists is a real issue. It was recently reported that 16 of 22 identified al Qaeda terrorists are still at large.

Military to military relations provide a good illustration of the ambiguities of the U.S.-Indonesia relationship. Has the Bush Administration requested financial support for the Indonesian military in the draft budget for the Defense Department? If there is global authorization for the U.S. military to offer training against terrorism this can be seen as an end run around the Leahy Amendment [to the Foreign Operations Act that prohibits any aid to Indonesia's military until they redress past human rights abuses].

However, perhaps not all the outcomes from September 11 are necessarily negative. If the recent meeting in Geneva on Aceh made some progress it may be because the GAM [Acehnese Independence Movement] attended; and its attendance may be because of increased pressure for settlement after September 11. General Zinni [President Bush's special envoy for Middle East negotiations] was reported to be present at that meeting.

PROCEEDINGS

Welcoming Remarks

Nancy Yuan: Indonesia is the largest Muslim country in the world and has been in the news almost daily for the past several months, particularly since September 11th, in matters about Indonesia's economy, about Indonesia's democracy under President Megawati's leadership, to discuss the problems in privatization or the perceived rise of Muslim extremism.

As representatives of the U.S.-Indonesia Society, the preeminent organization trying to promote understanding of Indonesia in the United States, and the Asia Foundation, which has operated and managed programs in Indonesia for nearly 50 years, we thought it an important and timely opportunity to bring some people here to talk more about the complex problems facing Indonesian Muslims today.

We are very pleased to bring to you a number of experts from Indonesia, Australia as well as American experts to give a more nuanced picture of the complexities of Islam, to examine Indonesia's future, to look at U.S.-Indonesia bilateral relations and issues that concern us all.

SESSION I - Indonesian Islam in a World Context

Azyumardi Azra: (Presented from the paper below prepared for the USINDO/TAF Conference)

INDONESIAN ISLAM IN A WORLD CONTEXT

1. Compared to Middle Eastern Islam, Indonesian Islam has a number of distinctive characteristics. By and large, Indonesian Islam is a moderate, accommodating kind of Islam, and the least Arabicized. For these reasons, the American anthropologist Clifford Geertz loves to call Islam in Java as "religion of Java," which he adopted as the title of his acclaimed book published in 1964. The term "religion of Java" refers to Islam in Java (as in many other places in Indonesia) that has been mixed and amalgamated with ancient pre-Islamic beliefs and socio-cultural traditions. Therefore, Indonesian Islam is much less rigid than Middle Eastern Islam. Not long ago, even *Newsweek* and *Time* magazine referred to Indonesian Islam as "Islam with a smiling

face" – Islam that is in many ways compatible with modernity, democracy, and pluralism.

2. Given these distinctive characteristics, it is not surprising if Indonesia – the largest Muslim nation in the world according to the Freedom House report "Freedom in the World 2002: The Democracy Gap" – is one of "bright spots" of democracy together with other less Arabicized Muslim countries including Bangladesh, Nigeria, and Iran. Freedom House found that while there is a democracy deficit in the Islamic Arab world – referred to as the Arabic core – democratic activity is considerable in countries with a significant Muslim population such as Albania, Bangladesh, Djibouti, the Gambia, Indonesia, Mali, Niger, Nigeria, Senegal, Sierra Leone, and Turkey.

3. The formation of distinctive characteristics of Indonesian Islam has a lot to do with two factors at least. First of these is the peaceful spread of Islam, which T.W. Arnold called "penetration pacifique" in his classic book, *The Preaching of Islam*. This is to say the spread of Islam was not through the use of force – from Arabia, for example – but rather by way of slow penetration over centuries and allowing for the accommodation of local beliefs and cultures. This process can also be referred to as the "indigenization" or "vernacularization" of Islam. Second, the structure of Indonesian society is very different from Middle Eastern society. For example, while Islamic Middle Eastern society is male-dominated, with women confined to the domestic sphere, Islamic Indonesian society allows for greater flexibility, and women enjoy much greater freedom.

4. The election of Vice President Megawati Soekarnoputri to replace the embattled President Abdurrahman Wahid on July 23, 2001, is representative of the freedom that women enjoy in Islamic Indonesia. President Megawati gained uncontested support not only from the Majelis Permusyawaratan Rakyat (MPR or Peoples' Consultative Assembly) but also from the majority of Indonesian Muslims. It is important to make it clear that large mainstream Muslim organizations such as the Nahdlatul Ulama (NU) and Muhammadiyah – which claim a membership of 40 and 35 million followers respectively – have no religious objections to Megawati as a female president. Other large regional Muslim organizations in Western and Eastern Indonesia took similar attitudes on this particular issue. A similar position was also taken by Islamic or Muslim-based parties like the PPP (Partai

Persatuan Pembangunan, or United Development Party), PBB (Partai Bulan Bintang, Star and Crescent Party), PK (Partai Keadilan, Justice Party), PKB (Partai Kebangkitan Bangsa, National Awakening Party), and PAN (Partai Amanat Nasional, National Mandate Party). The PPP, which had staunchly opposed Megawati on religious grounds in the pre- and post-general election of 1999, later accepted Megawati as president. In fact, the national chairman of PPP, Hamzah Haz, was elected vice president during the special session of the MPR on July 24, 2001, creating a duet of leadership that consists of a secular nationalist represented by Megawati and a religious nationalist represented by Hamzah Haz.

5. Only a limited number of hardliner Muslim groups opposed the ascendancy of Megawati on the grounds of gender, because according to their literal understanding of Islam, Islamic law does not permit a woman to hold the highest level of leadership in a Muslim society. These groups, while losing momentum after the impeachment of President Wahid, came to the forefront in a more visible, vocal, and militant manner in the aftermath of the terrorists' attacks on the World Trade Center in New York and the Pentagon in Washington DC. Even though these groups, like the Front Pembela Islam (FPI, Islamic Defence Front), Laskar Jihad, Hizb al- Tahrir (Party of Liberation) and Majelis Mujahidin Indonesia (MMI, Indonesian Council of Jihad Fighters), exert only a limited influence among Indonesian Muslims as a whole, they try to make use of any possible issue related to Islam for their own purposes, such as to undermine President Megawati's authority. President Megawati, however, will survive the challenge of radical political Islam because of the sustained support of mainstream Muslims.

6. The existence of hardliner, militant, radical, or even "fundamentalist" Muslims within Indonesian Islam that have been so visible recently and are even regarded to have kidnapped the center stage of Indonesian Islam in the aftermath of the September 11 terrorist attack, is actually not new. There were radical groups during the Soekarno and Soeharto periods that attempted to establish an Islamic state in Indonesia, and to replace Pancasila – the ideological common platform that had been accepted by virtually all Muslim as well as secular nationalist leaders. These groups were known as the DI/TII (Dar al-Islam/Tentara Islam Indonesia, or Islamic State/the Army of Islam in Indonesia) in the 1950s. Later, during the Soeharto period, radical groups like the NII (Negara Islam Indonesia, Islamic State of Indonesia) and "Komando Jihad" Jihad Command again attempted to establish an Islamic state in

Indonesia. It is important to note that some of these radical groups during the Soeharto period were believed to have been engineered by certain army generals in order to discredit Islam. But all of these radical attempts failed not only because of the harsh and repressive measures of the Indonesian army, but also because they failed to gain support from the mainstream Muslim population.

7. The fall of President Soeharto after more than three decades in power, and the following political liberalization, has brought momentum to the rise of radical Muslim groups. Many of them are new, such as the Front Komunikasi Ahlu-Sunnah Wal-Jama'ah (FKASWJ) with its better known paramilitary group, the Laskar Jihad (Jihad Troops), the Front Pembela Islam (Islamic Defense Front), the Majelis Mujahidin Indonesia (Indonesian Council of Jihad Fighters), the Jamaah al-Ikhwan al-Muslimin Indonesia (JAMI), and some other smaller groups. There is no accurate account of the origin and establishment of these groups, which have made their appearance since the interregnum of President BJ Habibie. There are reports that some in their leadership have been close to certain army generals; therefore some observers assert that their rise has been sponsored, or at least helped, by elements in the Indonesian military. However, what is clear is that leaders of Arab – particularly Yemeni – origin are at the helm of these groups. Habib Rizq Shihab is the leader of the FPI, Jafar Umar Thalib leads the Laskar Jihad; Abu Bakar Baasyir leads the MMI; Habib Husen al-Habsyi the Ikhwan al-Muslimin Indonesia. Even though each of these groups claims [to have] a large number of members, it is clear that their membership and influence are very limited.

8. Religiously speaking, these groups tend to adopt a literal interpretation and understanding of Islam. Furthermore, they insist that Muslims should practice only what they call the "pure" and "pristine" Islam as practiced by the Prophet Muhammad and his Companions (Sahabah, or the Salaf). Given these terms, they can be included among the Salafi movements. Based on their literal understanding of Islam and Salafi's activism, they attacked discotheques, bars, and other places they considered as "places of vice." Within this kind of Islamic worldview they understand the concept of jihad as "holy war" against those they consider enemies of Islam and of Muslims. In fact, "jihad" means "exerting oneself to the utmost" in any kind of Muslim activities. "Jihad" as "war" is only allowed as the last resort to defend Islam and Muslims from hostile enemies.

9. In addition to the above-mentioned groups, there are older groups that have been in existence since the time of Soeharto, but escaped the regime's harsh measures because they made some adjustments not only politically vis-à-vis the regime, but also religiously vis-à-vis the mainstream Muslims. The most important of such groups is the Hizb al-Tahrir (Party of Liberation), which was originally established in Lebanon by Shaykh Taqi al-Din al-Nabhani, and was first introduced to Indonesia in 1972. The main objectives of the Hizb al-Tahrir are to perpetuate what it regards as the true Islamic way of life globally and, most importantly, to re-establish the *khilafah* (caliphate), a universal Islamic political entity, which is believed to be the most suitable and effective political system by which to achieve Muslim unity. To achieve these goals, the Hizb al-Tahrir seems to have little difficulty in resorting to radicalism. This is why it soon became one of the most popular movements among disenchanted students and young people, not only in the Middle East, but also among Muslim students in Western countries. After the fall of Soeharto the Indonesian Hizb al-Tahrir became more visible, assertive, and vocal in voicing its ideals; it was also very active in mass-demonstrations against the U.S. in the aftermath of September 11, and subsequent U.S. military operations in Afghanistan. Though it is more visible today, its leader told me the membership of the Hizb al-Tahrir has not increased in any significant way.

10. There is little doubt that the radical groups mentioned above have some theological or organizational connections with particular groups in the Middle East or elsewhere in the Muslim world. It has already been noted that the leadership of newer groups is often of Middle Eastern origin and tends to be Middle-Eastern oriented in their ideology. Older groups such as the Indonesian Hizb al-Tahrir did in fact originate in the Middle East. It is difficult, however, to ascertain their possible connection with Osama bin Laden or al Qaeda. The leaders of FPI, Laskar Jihad and JAMI have denied any connection with Osama bin Laden or al Qaeda. In fact many leaders of these groups are very critical of Osama bin Laden whom they accuse of being *Kharijites* (*Kharijites* are those Muslims who seceded from the *ummah* or Muslim community).

11. The MMI, centered in a village in Surakarta, Central Java, has been accused of having connection with the al Qaeda. The group is led by Abu Bakar Baasyir, a religious teacher who is also the head of the al-Mukmin Pesantren and is known to have close links with the Kumpulan Muslim Militan Malaysia

(KMMM, Malaysian Militant Muslim Group). In the late 1980s he went to Malaysia to escape Soeharto's repressive measures because of his illegal activities against the Indonesian government. He returned to Indonesia only after the fall of Soeharto while maintaining, it seems, his contacts with his Malaysian counterparts. Later he was also associated with the Jamaah Islamiyah, which authorities think has cells operating in Malaysia, Singapore and Indonesia. Some of these groups have been allegedly linked with al Qaeda after the arrest of Fathur Rahmah al-Ghozi by the Philippine police on January 15. When questioned by Indonesian police, Abu Bakar Baasyir denied the allegation that he is the leader of the al Qaeda-linked Jamaah Islamiyah network. Indonesian authorities and police have maintained that both al-Ghozi and Baasyir have no links to al Qaeda; but they promise to investigate further. Therefore, a much deeper investigation involving ASEAN governments is needed to clarify the matter. Discussions about terrorism instigated by President Megawati's recent tour to ASEAN member states must be followed by concrete plans to stop and defeat terrorists with global connections.

12. The increased radicalism of the groups mentioned above undoubtedly has a lot to do with the government failure to enforce the law and solve a number of acute social ills such as continued ethno-religious conflicts, marked increase of crimes, rampant corruption at every level of society, and more widespread drug abuse. The abrupt decline of central government authority together with the demoralization of the police force have permitted these groups to take law into their own hands. Therefore, one important key to solving the rise of radicalism is restoring government authority and restrengthening law enforcement agencies.

13. In response to the apparent rise of radical groups, the two largest mainstream Muslim organizations – Nahdlatul Ulama and Muhammadiyah – have voiced their objection to radical ways. But their voices do not seem to have been strong enough, or seem to have been overlooked by the media, which seem to have a greater interest in radical groups. But since last November the two organizations have paid more serious attention to the impacts of Muslim hardliners upon the image of Indonesian Islam. They admit that the image of Indonesian Islam has worsened following the massive demonstrations against the U.S. in the aftermath of the U.S. military operation in Afghanistan. Therefore, leaders of both organizations have agreed that they will again project an image of Islam as calm and protecting of other people and other religions. The national leaders of the NU and

Muhammadiyah, Hasyim Muzadi and Ahmad Syafii Ma'arif respectively, say that the image of Islam has been politicized by certain radical groups; such radicalism represents political influences rather than Islamic thinking. Therefore both organizations plan to carry out a series of activities to tackle extremism through open dialogues, joint programs and other activities. Both have also appealed to the Indonesian government to take harsh measures against groups that break the law. Syafii warns that if stern measures are not taken against radical groups, laxity could pave the way for increased radicalism.

14. Given the strong position taken by the mainstream Muslim organizations, it is very hard to imagine that Indonesia could become a hotbed of "Talibanism." This does not mean dismissing the possibility of the existence of radical Islam in Indonesian. It is clear that, as in any other religion, some forms of radicalism will continue to exist among Muslims in Indonesia. But, given the stronger position of mainstream Muslim organizations, the influence of radical groups can be contained. For this reason they will fail to have any significant impact to change the peaceful nature of Islam in Indonesia.

15. President Megawati is expected to rebuild Indonesian political stability as well as to lead the country to economic recovery. The expectation seemed to be fulfilled by the Megawati presidency until the September 11 tragedy and the subsequent U.S. military operation in Afghanistan. Massive demonstrations and the threat of Muslim hardliners targeting foreigners have hurt prospects for political stability and economic recovery. President Megawati's slow response has only worsened the political and economic situation. President Megawati's subsequent tougher and firmer policy towards hardliner Muslims has helped the government to restore its credibility. The key here is that the Indonesian government should consolidate its policy at both the domestic and international levels, to make it possible for President Megawati to silence skepticism and criticism originating from the government's indecisive and slow response.

16. The U.S. should adopt a very cautious policy regarding Muslim radicalism in Indonesia. Americans should not overemphasize the threat of these radical groups, since it could give them more publicity, which they seek. As clear from above, the majority of Indonesian Muslims does not have a great deal of sympathy for the radicalism expressed by some of their co-religionists. But American overreaction would increase uneasiness towards the U.S. among mainstream Muslims, and could end up

alienating even the moderate Muslims. And this is really what the radicals are looking for, that is to bring the moderates into their fold. Furthermore, it could again give momentum for the radicals to challenge the Megawati presidency, creating Indonesian political instability.

17. Further strengthening and empowerment of democratic elements within mainstream Indonesian Islam is one of the ways to address radicalism. It is the responsibility of all of us to enhance Indonesia's nascent democracy. Given the numerical majority of Muslims, this could be done through mainstream Islamic institutions and organizations that have committed themselves to the ideals of building Islamic civility, democracy, plurality, tolerance, respect for human rights, and peaceful co-existence among various groups. For example, in 2000, sponsored by the Asia Foundation, the State Institute/University for Islamic Studies (IAIN/UIN) Jakarta launched a new course on "Civic Education" for its new students and student leaders. Through the "Civic Education" course, students are introduced to the idea and practice of Islamic civility in relation to democracy, pluralism and other related subjects. The program is preparing for nationwide implementation in 13 other IAINs and 33 Islamic colleges (STAINs). We hope that through these and other similar programs, Indonesians will make sure democracy is the "only game in town."

Mark Woodward: I want to do two things in the next few minutes. One of them is to offer some background and the other is to talk about some contacts between Indonesia and the Middle East that do not have the radical connotations that often are assumed in the media. There's often an assumption that we can think of Islam in terms of a center and a periphery, and that the further away from Arabia you get, the less Islamic things are. That is perhaps something that some Saudis like to believe. Former President of Indonesia Abdurrahman Wahid once told me that the problem with Saudis is that they do not know the difference between Islam and their own culture. And I think that that has a profound implication.

Actually we can go back as far as the eighteenth century and see that the Muslim world was and remains a very interconnected system. When you look at the community of Islamic scholars in Mecca in the eighteenth century and until the Wahabis assumed control of the area, it was a genuine global community. It was a community in which one found Arab-Persians, Africans, Indonesians (who were that time called the "Jawa"), serving both as students and

teachers. Some of the real luminaries of the Islamic theological tradition in the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries were in fact from Southeast Asia. Some of their work still circulates widely in Arabic in the Middle East. One that comes to mind is *Nawawi al Bantani*. These individuals wrote in Arabic which meant that many of us did not become familiar with their work and that many in the Arabic-speaking world were probably not certain of the ethnicity of the authors. But then Islam has always made it clear that ethnicity or race are not significant issues. This tradition of connections with the Middle East also took the form of a lot of movement back and forth, particularly between Yemen and Southeast Asia.

The Yemeni communities in Java and other parts of Indonesia are centuries old and while it is true that the leadership of some of the current radical groups is Yemeni, former foreign minister, Ali Alatas, is also of Yemeni origin. So I think that ethnic origin does not necessarily translate into theological orientation. Similarly, the Sufi orders play a very significant role in traditional Southeast Asian Islam. They are international in scope. The most important Sufi order in Indonesia is the *Nakshabandhis*, a genuinely global order. One of the most important *Nakshabandhis* sheikhs in the world is currently based in California and maintains a most wonderful website for anyone who wants to check it out. The spiritual center of the *Nakshabandhi* order is in Uzbekistan. The founder of the order is buried in Samarkand. So there again there is an old and well established global connection. It goes everywhere from Central Asia to California to *pesantren* in East Java.

There are a couple of new developments, really post-World-War Two developments that I think are extraordinarily significant. Over the last fifty years and increasingly moving into the present there are a very significant number of Indonesian students studying Islam, Islamic history, Islamic theology, in three major world areas. One of them is in Cairo at Al-Azhar University, the most prominent among these students are affiliated with Nahdlatul Ulama, the traditionalist Javanese-based religious organization, formerly headed by Abdurrahman Wahid. They also maintain a very extensive web page. If you read Indonesian you can get several hundred emails from them a day. That is a very active group and they are very much in dialogue with liberal intellectual Islamists from the Middle East: people like Hassan Hanafi for example who is constantly in trouble with the Egyptian radicals.

Another group includes students in various Islamic universities in Saudi Arabia. Needless to say, as students in Saudi Arabia they receive an education that is much more oriented towards a Wahabi formulation of Islam. (This is a very strict literalistic understanding of Islam.)

The third area with a large number of Indonesian students, and here we are really talking about the people who are the Islamic leaders of the future, are the United States and Europe. We have a significant number of these people among us today, people who have very solid traditional Islamic education as young folk in Indonesia and who have gone on to obtain Ph.Ds from institutions like McGill, UCLA, University of Chicago, Australian National University, and so on. Within this group there are a lot of theological divergences. Nurcholish Madjid, who is probably the leading liberal intellectual in Indonesia today and Amien Rais, who one can never tell whether he is a democrat or a radical (it depends on whom he is talking to and in what language) are both Ph.D. level graduates of the University of Chicago, and were there at the same time. So you can't necessarily assume from where someone was educated, exactly what his theoretical or political orientation is going to be. I do not think it can be assumed that if there's a connection with the Middle East, that must mean trouble! It's not necessarily true. Middle Eastern Islam is not all radical; that's just what we hear about on the news, and Islam is a genuinely global community. Consequently, wherever you go in the Muslim world, you can find close to the full spectrum of Islamic thinking on theological issues, on social issues, on political issues.

Robert Hefner: (His remarks were taken from the following paper, first published in the *Van Zorge Report*, Indonesia)

INDONESIAN ISLAM AT THE CROSSROADS

For students of comparative Muslim politics, the end of the twentieth century was marked by especially interesting developments in two countries, Iran and Indonesia. Iran is important because it is the only country in the Muslim world to have gone through the full process of an Islamic revolution, the establishment of an Islamic republic, and the post-revolutionary maturation of that polity. The third of these phases has proved to be the most revealing. The Islamic Republic managed to expand higher education and create a new Muslim middle class. The election of the reform President Khatami in May 1997 demonstrated, however, that the youth wing of

this new middle class has grown deeply disaffected with the reigning conservative interpretation of Muslim politics. The children of the revolution seem more interested in the creation of a civil society with real intellectual, social, and political pluralism than they do the old shibboleths of ulama leadership. Architect of the revolutionary purges at the University of Teheran in the mid- 1980s, Abdolkarim Soroush's evolution from Islamist radical to a courageous spokesperson for democracy and secular freedom provides just one of the many indices of this breathtaking, if still unfinished, transformation.

When, a few years from now, historians of Muslim politics look back at the end of the twentieth century, Indonesia probably deserves to be given pride of place on par with that of Iran. Indonesia is a Sunni country, vastly poorer and less educated than the Iran of 1979 or today. Nonetheless, in the final years of the Soeharto era, this country created a movement for a democratic reorientation of Muslim political thinking that, after Iran, was arguably the Muslim world's most vibrant. The democracy movement that toppled President Soeharto in May 1998 was, of course, a multireligious coalition that included Christians and secular nationalists in its ranks. Among its core theorists, however, was a diverse group of intellectuals interested in devising good Islamic grounds for pluralism, democracy, tolerance, and civil society. Although hardnosed political observers may sniff at such things, a vital ingredient in Muslim politics is that political initiatives must be justified in relation to divine injunctions and religious commentaries. Indonesia in the 1990s had an efflorescence of just such thinking on matters of democracy and pluralism. Moreover, unlike the similar efforts made by Muslim intellectuals in Egypt, Morocco, or Syria, this reorientation of Muslim politics wasn't just the work of a few ivory tower intellectuals. On the contrary, the initiative showed one of the key features political theorists like Guillermo O'Donnell and Philippe Schmitter identify as vital for a successful transition from authoritarian rule: a coalitional structure linking "exemplary individuals" and intellectuals to mass based organizations in society. Measured according to its intellectual vitality and prospective mass base, Indonesia in the late 1990s was one of the most vibrant centers for new Muslim political thinking the modern world has seen.

Sadly, Indonesia's great achievement may never get the credit it deserves because the movement for democratic Muslim politics was quickly overtaken by events on the ground anything but civil or democratic. As I know from recent conversations

with Middle Eastern intellectuals, the violence in Maluku and the rise of radical Islamist paramilitaries have greatly tarnished Indonesia's reputation as a center of civil-pluralist Islam. Almost no Muslim intellectual in the Middle East thinks of Indonesia in these terms today. Far too pessimistically, I believe, most instead wonder whether this country is not descending into neofundamentalist vigilantism.

In this paper I want to offer a few preliminary reflections on recent developments in Indonesian Muslim politics, and explore what they might tell us about the future. Despite some contrary reports in the Western media, the center of cultural gravity among Indonesian Muslims remains, I believe, predominantly moderate. However, to borrow a phrase from the California political sociologist Peter Evans, the challenge of "scaling up" the qualities of moderation and civility in Muslim society into effective democratic governance has proved far greater than most observers realized several years ago. To understand why this has proved to be the case, we need to reflect on Muslim politics in the final years of the Soeharto regime and the first years of the post-Soeharto era.

AMPLIFYING THE UNCIVIL

In their *Transitions from Authoritarian Rule*, Guillermo O'Donnell and Philippe Schmitter have noted that some post-authoritarian transitions are greatly assisted by a "popular upsurge" in which interest groups in society put aside differences of ethnicity, religion, and class and rally to the idea that they are a people united by a common interest in democratic reform. In the case of post-Soeharto Indonesia, the chances for such an upsurge were greatly diminished by the fact that, rather than strengthening the public consensus on the terms of the nation, in its final years the Soeharto regime greatly exacerbated ideological disagreement.

It is this unfortunate legacy that was so starkly apparent in the speed with which the coalition that had united to oust Soeharto in May 1998 broke down into warring ideological camps after the president resigned. The primary line of ideological divide pitted an alliance of Islamist groupings interested in heightening Islam's role in the state against an equally diverse array of actors intent on maintaining state structures of a more multireligious or "secular nationalist" sort. The election of Abdurrahman Wahid to the presidency in October 1999 briefly raised hopes that this great divide might yet be bridged and the process of political reform restarted. Rather than diminishing, however, the gap between these two camps only widened. The reasons for this are many,

but certainly one influence was that Wahid himself misperceived the strength of his support and undertook initiatives (opening relations with Israel, lifting the ban on the Indonesian Communist Party) offensive to the centrist and conservative wings of the Muslim camp. By the end of his presidency in July 2001, whatever had remained of the coalition that had swept Wahid to power lay in ruins.

The failure of the reform coalition to hold together is related to a second feature of the post-Soeharto transition. It is that, aside from Soeharto and a few of his closest allies, most of the old regime remained in place after the president's departure. Kees van Dijk is guilty of only a small measure of hyperbole when he observed, "The 'Reformation Order' which had come into being was not much more than the New Order minus the Soeharto family" (*A Country in Despair*, p. 298). While continuity of this sort might lead some political observers to speculate that old regime stalwarts would unite against the forces of reform, what happened in fact was not nearly so simple. Old regime holdovers did obstruct portions of the reform program, but they were far from united in their efforts or ideological vision. At both the national and local level, political elites responded to the vacuum created by Soeharto's departure by reaching out to groupings in society in an effort to mobilize popular support against rivals. In some parts of the country, such as Yogyakarta and East Kalimantan, local government demonstrated great skill at keeping this patronage-cum-ideological competition within civil bounds. In Maluku, Central Kalimantan, Poso, and a few other regions, however, the rivalry got quickly out of hand, with some claimants mobilizing support by deliberately exacerbating ethnoreligious tensions.

In some of the most serious conflicts, this populist sectarianism was made even worse by rival elites' reliance on another category of social actor that had come to prominence during the Soeharto era: the organized political-cum-criminal syndicates known as *preman*. Gangsterism in the New Order had always tended to display an ideological face, and it oriented that face to whatever was the reigning ideology in the regime. Gangs did this in large part to give themselves an air of public-service respectability. Whereas the dominant gang groups in the early New Order were nationalist, by the end of the New Order period some of the largest groups adopted an Islamist garb. Turf wars were common, however, and in a few parts of the country they pitted Islamist gangs against Christian and nationalist groups. Where, as in Maluku or Poso, political rivalries were exacerbated by this flammable mixture of elite factionalism, extra-legal gangsterism, and

ethnoreligious tensions, the result could be deadly indeed.

Any effort to assess the situation of Islam in post-Soeharto Indonesia must begin with this background of elite factionalism and populist sectarianism. One reason it is important to do so is that, in the aftermath of September 11, 2001, foreign observers unfamiliar with Indonesia have sometimes exaggerated the strength of radical Islamism in the country and, conversely, overlooked the role of simple patronage and extralegal competition in exacerbating social tensions. The elections of June 1999 revealed quite clearly that the appeal of even a moderately-conservative Islamism, defined, for example, by the ambition to apply Islamic law to the Muslim populace, has declined since the 1950s. Only about 16% of the vote went to parties advocating programs of this sort, as opposed to more than 40% in 1955. At the same time, however, most other social indicators suggest that the country's Muslim majority is considerably more conscientious about the conduct of confessional duties than it was a generation or two ago. This suggests that it is not piety or Islamization that presents a destabilizing challenge in today's Indonesia, but a breakdown of governance exacerbated by elite factionalism and the willingness of some national and local elites to take advantage of ethnoreligious tensions for their own purposes. It is this larger political crisis that has allowed a small, conservative segment of the Muslim community to exercise an influence vastly out of proportion with its representation in society.

To appreciate how this state of affairs came to be, it is helpful to recall that in its last years the New Order was not the Soehartoist monolith that many foreign academics had long imagined. From 1990 on, the ruling party and the military were plagued by bitter factional divides between those eager to play the Islamist card and those (also mostly Muslim) inclined to support policies of a multireligious or secular nationalist sort. True to his habit of playing rival claimants to power against each other, President Soeharto took advantage of this rivalry, using the so-called green or "Islamist" generals to counter the influence of the "red" or secular nationalist generals, and preventing both groups from posing a serious challenge to his rule. In retrospect, it appears that the distinction between red and green generals had as much to do with simple rivalry for power and patronage as it did deep-seated differences of religion or ideology. Once the most prominent of the green generals, Lieutenant General Prabowo Subianto, was removed from office after May 1998, several of the leading red or nationalist generals established close

ties with hardline Islamists like the Islamic Defenders Front (Front Pembela Islam).

Whatever the generals' precise rationale, the impact of these rivalries on the fortunes of the conservative Islamist community was striking. From 1994 on, Soeharto and his aides provided extensive funding and tactical support to what had previously been a largely ineffectual assortment of hardline Islamists. Rather than scaling up Indonesia's movement for a civic-pluralist Islam, Soeharto and his aides pushed the movement back, relying on Islamist hardliners for help in the effort. The pattern continued in the post-Soeharto period, with several members of the old-regime elite establishing close ties with paramilitary groups like the Islamic Defenders Front and, more recently, the Laskar Jihad.

From the beginning, the turn to radical Islamism inspired controversy in civilian political circles, including the ruling party, Golkar. Although for most of its history Golkar had been a broad alliance that included Christians and secular nationalists as well as pious Muslims, in 1994 President Soeharto awarded control of the party's powerful "strategy bureau" (Litbang Golkar) to hardliners who had close ties to the green faction in the armed forces and who shared their patrons' interest in exploiting conservative Islamism for their own ends. In collaboration with these commanders, the strategy bureau helped craft many of the fiercely anti-Chinese, anti-Christian, and anti-American propaganda tracts issued during the last months of Soeharto rule. Booklets like the "Conspiracy to Overthrow Soeharto" described an evil conspiracy in which the U.S., the Vatican, Israel's Mossad, abangan Javanese (i.e. nominal Muslims), and Chinese Indonesians engineered the 1997-1998 financial crisis so as to drive Soeharto from power. Distributed in conservative Islamist circles just weeks prior to the riots of May 13-14, 1998, the book ended by calling for enemies of Islam to be driven from Indonesia once and for all, hinting the Chinese might be especially deserving of such drastic treatment.

The man who directed the Litbang Golkar during this period retired temporarily from national politics after Soeharto's resignation. He resurfaced just a few months into the Habibie administration, however, when he was appointed to the Council of Indonesian Islamic Scholars (Majelis Ulama Indonesia). From there, he provided behind-the-scene support for the effort to unseat Abdurrahman Wahid. From early 2000 to today, he has acted as a behind-the-scene mediator between the Council and paramilitary groupings like the Laskar Jihad. In early October

2001, as the United States threatened to launch strikes against Afghanistan, this same gentleman was one of the key figures behind the MUI appeal calling for jihad against the United States and a severing of diplomatic relations. All this shows that, although Soeharto is gone, the Islamist card is still being played as forcefully as ever.

UNCIVIL ISLAM

These examples show that a small but influential group of Muslim leaders have helped to provide legitimacy and tactical support for the activities of radical Islamist groupings, even though the majority of Muslims may have little sympathy for their actions. However much they might benefit from strategic patronage, however, it is important not to see groups like the Islamic Defenders Front or, especially, the Laskar Jihad as mere creations of an all-controlling elite. After all, a key feature of the post-Soeharto period is that there is no all-powerful party or political leadership comparable to that of the Soeharto regime. Rather than diminishing trawling expeditions into the Islamist community like those begun in the late Soeharto period, however, the weakening and fractionalization of state power appears to have increased their incidence.

It is also important to recognize that, however small their representation in Muslim society, groups like the Laskar Jihad and Majelis Mujahidin are heirs to a tradition of radical politics and religion in the Muslim community that, although suppressed in the first years of the Soeharto era, has always operated on the fringe of Indonesian society. Founded in August 2000 with the aim of struggling for the implementation of Islamic law, the Indonesian Mujahidin Council (Majelis Mujahidin Indonesia) includes among its senior leadership figures earlier associated with the Darul Islam, a movement that declared an Islamic state and then did battle with the forces of the republic from 1948-1962. The movement's spiritual leader, Abu Bakar Ba'asyir - a man whom Malaysian and Philippines intelligence have recently claimed is the leader of the Jemaah Islamiyah, which these intelligence services claim has ties with the al Qaeda - served prison time in the late 1970s for his opposition to Soeharto politics and the Pancasila. When, in the mid-1990s, hardline Islamists in groups like KISDI and the Dewan Dakwah Islamiyah Indonesia reconciled with President Soeharto and joined him in attacking the democracy movement, Ba'asyir and his associated remained unreconstructed critics of Soeharto and the armed forces. This legacy explains in part why Ba'asyir and the Majelis Mujahidin Indonesia have not enjoyed the cordial reception some green officers in

the armed forces have offered other neofundamentalist groupings.

The Laskar Jihad is one of the radical Islamist organizations long thought to enjoy the patronage of a small but significant faction of the armed forces. The Laskar Jihad grew out of a conservative religious movement founded in the early 1990s by a (now) 40-year-old Arab Indonesian, Jafar Umar Thalib. Jafar identifies his followers as "Salafy," a reference to a long-established movement in Islam, often associated with Saudi Wahhabism, that aims to model profession of the faith on the example of the first generation of followers of the Prophet. However, in the form promoted by Jafar, the movement is best understood as neofundamentalist or "neo-Salafy," because it emphasizes ultraconservative concerns not associated with earlier variants of Salafism, not least of those practiced in Saudi Arabia. One such emphasis is the firm belief that the United States and Israel are leading a world-wide conspiracy to destroy Islam.

Jafar Umar Thalib began his career studying in a conservative modernist religious school in Bangil, East Java in 1981. Unhappy with the apolitical nature of his instruction, he soon traveled to Jakarta to study at the Saudi-sponsored Institute for Islamic and Arabic Studies. In the capital, Jafar became active in student groups opposed to the secular nationalist policies of the Soeharto regime. Awarded a scholarship by the conservative Indonesian Council for Islamic Predication (DDII), Jafar traveled in 1986 to Saudi Arabia for further religious study. Again impatient with the apolitical nature of his lessons, he left for Afghanistan in 1987 under the auspices of the Saudi-sponsored Muslim World League. In Afghanistan, he met briefly with Osama bin Laden, but opted to join with a faction of the mujahidin with ties to the Saudis rather than Osama. In 1989, Jafar returned to Indonesia, accepting a teaching post at a conservative Islamic school in Salatiga, Central Java. Eager to make a name for himself, in 1994 he founded a religious school twelve miles north of the city of Yogyakarta in south-central Java.

From the beginning Jafar's proselytization was distinctive in that it was primarily directed not at the Muslim community as a whole, but at university students in the exact sciences and professions. Students with these backgrounds, Jafar explained to me in August 2001, appreciate the "precision" of Islamic law. In this respect they differ from students in the social sciences and humanities, whose studies, Jafar observed, leave them "only more confused." From the beginning of his career, Jafar's

proselytization efforts were also distinctive in the way in which they combined old predication techniques, like the use of public rallies, with new technologies, such as the internet and electronic publishing. In sermons whose fiery cadences and emotionalism violate almost everything Western scholars associate with Javanese self-expression, Jafar hammers away at his themes of the failures of secular nationalism, the perfidy of infidels (especially Christians), and, most important, the need for Muslims to wage jihad. Jihad is required, Jafar emphasizes, so as to cleanse society of un-Islamic influences and to bring God's law into daily life. It is also needed to insure that unbelievers understand that their proper status in society must be that of protected minorities (*dhimmi*). A concept from classical Islamic politics, *dhimmi*-hood stipulates that non-Muslims not be allowed to exercise authority over Muslims. Unlike most of the Indonesian Muslim leadership, Jafar makes clear that he believes that the equal citizenship sanctioned by the Indonesian constitution is utterly antithetical to Islam.

Recently some Indonesian analysts have speculated that the Laskar Jihad may have ties to bin Laden's al Qaeda. In interviews with journalists, Jafar has admitted that he has been visited several times by al Qaeda representatives, as recently, even, as May of 2001. Jafar denies reports, however, that al Qaeda fighters have recently traveled to Maluku to join the battle against Christians. He and his spokespersons were outraged when, in late September, Al Chaidar, a prominent militant from a more moderate wing of another radical organization, the Darul Islam, claimed that bin Laden agents had supplied the Laskar with \$240,000 and several dozen Arab fighters. Laskar officials issued an immediate and threatening denial.

The issue of al Qaeda links did not end there, however. In late fall, 2001, Western journalists traveling in Sulawesi reported seeing Afghan and Arab fighters. On December 12, 2001, Indonesia's intelligence chief, Lt. General Abdullah Hendropriyono confirmed these reports, commenting that Al-Qaeda had established a training camp in Indonesia and was assisting jihad fighters in Maluku and Central Sulawesi. The next day the minister of defense, Matori Abdul Djilil, publicly announced that he had "full confidence" in the validity of Hendropriyono's comments. Court documents provided to Indonesian authorities, and related to the arrest in November of Al-Qaeda agents in Spain, also seemed to confirm the allegations. The documents included photographs and written reports

of what were said to be Al-Qaeda camps in Indonesia.

Furious at Hendropriyono's charges, conservative Muslims, including the secretary of the Indonesian Council of Scholars (the same man who had helped coordinate the Council's call for jihad against the U.S.), accused Hendropriyono of being "one sided" and doing the bidding of the United States in making these accusations. No doubt Hendropriyono and Matori had hoped that their appeals might rally sentiment among the military, police, and political elite for action against radical Islamic groups.

The outcome of the effort provides a revealing insight into the state of opinion among the security and political elite. With the exception of Matori, virtually no one backed up Hendropriyono's remarks. Faced with fierce criticism and little elite support, Hendropriyono backed away from his charge three days after first making it. He claimed that he had been "misunderstood," and insisted he had never said al Qaeda had a cell in Indonesia or that the Laskar Jihad was linked to it. His formal retraction was given prominent billing on the lead page of the Laskar Jihad's web site.

Although his lieutenants expressed enthusiasm for Osama bin Laden in several interviews they gave in 2000, since September 11, 2001 Jafar has gone to great lengths to condemn the radical leader. The grounds on which he has done so, however, are revealing. Where Jafar and his followers have taken greatest exception with bin Laden is, not on the question of the mass killing of innocents in the United States, but on bin Laden's opposition to Saudi Arabia. For Jafar, bin Laden's opposition to a state that enforces Islamic law marks him as a "Khawarij" rebel. The phrase refers to the "exiters" who dissented from the followers of Ali at the end of the seventh century C.E. and promoted what has come to be regarded as a rebellious and ultra-egalitarian Islam unacceptable to the Sunni mainstream.

Whatever his Middle Eastern connections, it is clear that there are sound political reasons for Jafar to repudiate al Qaeda. Since its establishment in early 2000, the Laskar Jihad has been vitally dependent on domestic backers. Jafar is an astute politician and in private conversations has made clear that he is keenly aware that, without this assistance, he would not have been able to catapult his once-marginal organization onto the national stage. A former field commander of the Laskar Jihad, whom I interviewed in August 2001 after he withdrew from the organization, provided a sense of just how some of this old regime support has

been arranged. The commander explained that Jafar was approached in January 2000 by military retirees with the message that they approved of his plans to escalate the armed campaign against Christians in Maluku. These agents made clear that they were willing to support Jafar's Maluku campaign, not to punish Christians, but to undermine the reform government of Abdurrahman Wahid. Jakartan Muslim activists provided additional details on these elite linkages. They noted, for example, that a leading businessman with close ties to ex-president Soeharto in 1998 coordinated a vast flow of funds and arms to the jihad forces after February 2000.

Tactical support of this sort was what allowed the Laskar Jihad to brandish weapons in the capital in April 2000, and then travel across Java from Bogor to Surabaya without once encountering so much as a single challenge to their movements—despite the fact that the president, minister of defense, and governor of Maluku province had all appealed to security officials to stop the militia from traveling to Maluku. Notwithstanding these appeals, the militants made their way unimpeded across Java; at times, eyewitnesses report, they even received security escorts. In Surabaya, the fighters boarded state-owned ferries for Maluku. Upon their arrival in Maluku, the fighters were escorted into the city and provided with weapons.

A similar tactical collaboration between factions of the political elite and radical Islamists has been evident in some of the "anti-vice" campaigns launched by hardline Islamists since 1999. In Surakarta in August 2001, a former leader of a hardline group who had grown disenchanted with the campaign when it targeted democracy activists told me, "The whole strategy to use the Islamists to attack places of immorality and the democracy movement wasn't something simply tolerated by security officials. It was designed by district officials in a series of meetings I attended during early 2001. The meetings involved the military, Golkar officials, and members of the PPP [the Islamic party]. The campaign's purpose was to mobilize conservative Islamists and destroy the last remnants of support for Abdurrahman Wahid and the democracy movement."

CONCLUSION

One could multiply these examples, but they all provide us with insights into the question posed at the beginning of this report, as to how radical groupings with a relatively small social base have managed to loom so large in recent months. The answer recalls an insight into transitions from authoritarian rule offered by the California political sociologist, Peter Evans.

Evans has observed that for a transition to succeed it is not enough that there be a democratic majority or vibrant civil society. For a transition to move forward, civil and democratic precedents in society have to be "scaled up" into governmental institutions capable of defending freedoms and promoting democratic habits in state and society alike. It is this type of democratic synergy that has proved so elusive in post-Soeharto Indonesia. Rather than building on already available resources in the Muslim community for democracy and pluralism, certain leaders have helped to give paramilitary extremists an influence vastly out of proportion with their numbers in society.

However, the contest for the hearts and minds of Indonesian Muslims is far from over. The majority of Indonesian Muslims are moderate; many support democracy and look with sympathy to the West. Despite the confusion in their leadership, a clear majority among Muslims are also uneasy with the jihadi violence in Maluku and yearn for a politics that is moderate and inclusive. The U.S. campaign against al Qaeda may yet give the conservatives additional ammunition to use against their moderate rivals, particularly if the United States extends its campaign into Iraq. Short of such drastic measures, however, the impact of the American-led effort need not be fatal.

Ultimately, however, the question of whether the tide of sectarian violence can be turned will depend on the efforts of Megawati and the mainstream Muslim leadership, as well as moderate elements in the armed forces. After the divide-and-conquer chaos of the Soeharto era, it is too early to expect a deep consensus among national and regional elites on the terms for citizenship and nation. But a working agreement to stop the violence and curb those leaders exploiting crude ethno-religious hatreds seems still possible. Only through the forging of a new working consensus of this sort can Indonesia be pulled back from the political and economic abyss it now faces. In these days of somber developments, the good news is that there are signs that, motivated by the mixture of love of country and devotion to the truest ideals of their religion, some in the Muslim community are yet determined to make just such an effort.

Session 1 Discussion

Joel Kuipers, The George Washington University: I'm intrigued by the comments about the association between literalist interpretations of Islam and political radicalism of different kinds. Those are two different ideas but they do seem to be associated in

various contexts and one of my questions is, what is the association that you see between these two ideas, and is it always the case in Indonesia; and second, do literalist interpretations of Islam in Indonesia always signal a more Middle Eastern orientation or are there specifically literalistic interpretations of Islam that challenge more Middle Eastern approaches?

Azra: What we refer to as radical groups should not be understood as monolithic. In fact they have different understandings as far as politics is concerned, for instance the Hizb al-Tahrir has a very literal understanding at the theological level and the literal understanding has been translated into political fields also. As I mentioned in my paper, the Hizb al-Tahrir for instance, aims at establishing the caliphate, because according to their understanding of Islam, the caliphate is the most appropriate and the most suitable political system for Muslims. Because of their literal understanding of Islam, they consider it obligatory for Muslims to establish an Islamic state in the form of the caliphate or *khilafah*. But other groups like the Laskar Jihad for instance, do not have a clear agenda for establishing particular Islamic political entities like the caliphate. In fact, certain forms of Islamic political entities are almost absent, in the discourse of Laskar Jihad. [Thus, radical groups are not always literalists.]

Of course they are insistent on the implementation of the *shariah* [Islamic law]. So there are a lot of different opinions about the Islamic state. But other more Salafis, or let's say more radical groups like the *Kharijites* I mentioned in my paper, also have a very distinctive political view, for example, that it is obligatory for Muslims to establish an Islamic state based on a particular *ayat*, a particular verse of the Koran that states "*mahukmah ilallah*," there is no law, there is no state, except the state that is based on the injunction of God himself. Therefore, they consider that Muslims who oppose the establishment of the Islamic state, those who follow laws that have not originated from God, are included amongst the unbelievers. This is the most radical interpretation of the literal understanding of Islam when translated it into political views.

Woodward: I'd like to pick up on those things. The distinction between neo-*kharijites* and people who are *salafis* is extremely important. The *Kharijite* movement dates back to the first centuries of Islam. *Kharijites* maintain that anyone who does not accept their understanding of Islam is called a *munafik* or a hypocrite, meaning someone who pretends to be a Muslim but who is working for the destruction of Islam. Now simply because someone is a *salafi* does

not mean that he should fall into that category. Muhammadiyah is a very good example of an organization that has this very narrow and strict understanding of Islamic morality and conduct but does not fall into this category of renouncing everyone else as worse than unbelievers. The other thing is that the politicization of Islam is not restricted to people who hold this narrow legalistic *salafi* view. My favorite example of that is a group that did not get very many votes in the last election. It is called the Peace and Love Party. The Peace and Love Party is the political branch of the *Nakshabandhi* Sufi order. They have a very Islamist, although Sufi-Islamist, perspective on Indonesia's problems: If everyone would say enough prayers, the problem would go away. The Indonesian or Arabic term here is *doa*, or supplication. That is also the politicization of Islam, but the politicization of a very different kind of Islam.

Walter Engelen, Maluku Watch Network: Do you think there is a correlation between state-supported Islam and radicalism? In the last years of Soeharto he created ICMI (Association of Indonesian Muslim Intellectuals), which was led by Habibie. It [radicalism] started then. Since 1945-1967 only two churches were burned but from 1967-1998, 400 churches were burned. Maluku is basically the latest in this process of radicalism. Also, from the end of the 1980s Muslim society has become more conservative. Muslim scholars get more funds from the government than the Christians. So my question is, do you think it is really a process?

Hefner: I think if we look at the results of the national elections; if we look at the leadership of organizations like the Nahdlatul Ulama and Muhammadiyah; and if we look at the IAIN and other major Muslim educational institutions, it becomes very difficult to support the thesis that the Muslim community as a whole in Indonesia has become more conservative. Nor has it become necessarily more liberal or civil-democratic, the term I prefer, although that is the general process. What has happened instead is that there has been a great pluralization of Islam in society. There has been a great Islamic resurgence but the fact that there has been an Islamic resurgence should never be equated with a trend towards a more conservative understanding of Islam.

The formation of ICMI was all part of an effort, on the part of President Soeharto and several others, to respond to what they saw as this great wave of Islamic resurgence sweeping across Indonesia and to use it for their own ends. They never quite succeeded

in that regard. ICMI, at least a small but a significant, morally significant and intellectually significant wing of it, continues to display a considerable amount of independence, not least of all through the work of Moeslim Abdurrahman here or Nurcholish Madjid.

So when we get to the question of Maluku, I think it's best to see the crisis of Maluku not as something that's the result of a general trend of conservative Islamization in society, but a breakdown in governance. And a radical mobilization, both at the local level and at the national level, among rival political elites who respond to the vacuum of power left in the aftermath of Soeharto's departure.

I end by just making this observation, because we are in the United States and perhaps there has been much more discussion of the violence in Maluku as it has been conducted by Muslims. We have to remember however, that at the beginning of the Maluku conflict, the side, if we want to use that phrase, that suffered most, that experienced the most casualties, was the Muslim side. And there were Christian Jihadis or Christian holy war fighters, who really were just like some of the hard-line Islamist groups, who were using religion as a cloak to advance political, economic in some instances, as well as religious interests. They engaged in violence such as that we saw in North Halmahera at the end of 1999; violence that was truly horrific, and when publicized in the media, needless to say, put wind in the sails of groups like the Laskar Jihad, who were able to assert that this required a strong response from Muslim organizations since the government was not acting.

Donald Emmerson, Stanford University: Recasting the previous proceedings in abstract form, my question is: what things are broken and what sort of fixability and priorities do you see here? I'm not suggesting that you select one and reject the others; I'm interested in the relative order of priority which of course has policy implications.

Here are some candidate propositions. Number one, what's broken is the theology; that is to say there is an urgent need for theological reform with regard to the content and interpretation of Islam. Number two, Islam is not broken, it's a matter of sociology. (This might be termed, the Hefner hypothesis.) It's a question of scaling up, of trying to encourage voluntarism and associational activity at the local level into larger forms, institutions that can maintain stability and accountability. Three, it's a matter of intelligence. Now none of you has said this, but one possible interpretation is you don't need to fix

society, you don't need to fix Islam, you need to fix a couple of individuals by arresting them. That is to say, it is a matter of security and everything else is pretty much okay. Number four, it's a matter of governance: unless you have a functioning democracy these problems are only going to get worse. Fifth and last, is a thesis that hasn't been mentioned at all, which is the economic explanation. As long as you have 13% shrinkage in the GDP as you did in 1998, that should be the focus of any effort to redress the situation.

Again I'm asking for relative priority.

Azra: I think the most important priority now is to restore the authority of the government, to strengthen the government. Because much of the problem, including the ethno-religious conflict that has been mentioned, originated from the failure of the government to enforce law and order. So we see conflict, the violence, not only takes place in Maluku, but also for instance in Borneo and Kalimantan, not only between Muslims and Christians but also among Muslims themselves.

We know that the violence in Kalimantan for instance, involves the Madurese who are Muslims, and the Malays as well as the Dayaks who are also Muslims. So I think one of the most important keys is to restore the government authority as well as the police because I think one of the problems in Indonesia today is the demoralization of the police force. We know the military, the armed forces, and the police have been a target of reforms, a target of *reformasi* because both of them have been held responsible for corruption, misgovernment, KKN (corruption, collusion and nepotism), and all ills in Indonesian society during Soeharto's time. So I think this is one of the most important priorities.

The second priority is the acceleration of the democratization process. Acceleration of the democratization process because we have to admit that Indonesia as a whole has very little experience in democracy. Many people, including of course young people, have a very obscure idea of the ideals and practice of democracy. I think in this regard Muslim organizations like Muhammadiyah and NU, as well as education institutions like mine, the Institution for Islamic Studies, can make a contribution on this. For instance, a civic education program for students is important because today many people including of course students have some kind of political disorientation because they have a very obscure idea of democracy.

The third priority is the economic recovery. Two years ago, I attended a democracy forum in the U.S.. In that forum one of the most important conclusions was that in order for a state or country in transition to be more democratic there are at least three pillars that should be established. The first one is strong government. Strong government does not necessarily mean an oppressive government. Strong government is a government that is able to protect democratic rights of its citizens. The second is a strong economy and the third is a strong civil society. Again one of the most important priorities is to restore civil society in Indonesia. In the last three years many civil society organizations including NU and Muhammadiyah have had some kind of disorientation. NU has been pulled into political crisis especially during the presidency of Abdurrahman Wahid. And of course Muhammadiyah has been pulled into Amien Rais' political game. Now we have to restore their former status.

Hefner: My own position is not that sociology and local society or the synergy between state and society is all that there is. Every transition from authoritarian rule and every culture and civilization's democratization requires that there be a scaling up of intellectual organizations as well as society organizations. What John Locke did was itself a vital part of providing a kind of intellectual legitimacy for a Christian embrace of the English system of the time. We take that for granted and we no longer perhaps need John Locke or whoever you prefer as the intellectual legitimator of the idea of democracy and human rights. But every civilization has to grapple with the terms or the grounds for providing a legitimating rationale for equality and tolerance. And in this instance, that task of providing just those intellectual terms is a vital ingredient of the Muslim tradition. And it means that some of the framework for scaling up intellectually the grounds for democratization in a Muslim society anywhere (I'm not speaking here with any specific reference to Indonesia), may vary.

As I said in the forum I would expect for an Islamic democracy not to be so much liberal in the classic early twentieth century civil democratic sense but to have more of a "communitarian" sense. Emphasizing, as American democracy did in de Toqueville's days, that a concern for sustaining certain shared public values must also be a key part of democracy. We in the West, or at least in the post 1960s West, have pulled back a bit from that commitment but there is an effort still on the part of some people to do that in the West. But in any case

we shouldn't be surprised in Indonesia if the emphasis is on a kind of "communitarian" response, to the idea that morals and public ethics must be a subject of public political concern. Those issues may loom large in the intellectual scaling up of Muslim democratic tradition and I think that is what we are seeing in Indonesia and it is also what we are seeing attempted on the part of leadership in Iran.

So in response to your question the options you present are not mutually exclusive. The critical thing is not democratization of Islam but the transition from authoritarianism to the creation of a healthy civil democratic synergy between state and society. For that to take place it requires good governance and probably also the arrest of a few people. And the fact that a few of those people have not been arrested provides one of the clearest indications that the government itself does not yet have the consensus that is required to take those actions. And that is one of the most serious problems in Indonesia today because it provides the kind of opportunity and imbalance that I described in my paper, an imbalance where in reality a small portion of the Muslim community where (a very un-Islamic metaphor) the tail is able to wag the dog. (Maaf) Sorry.

As to U.S. policy and what this means I think that democratization is always enduringly and necessarily incremental. You take advantage of every opportunity you can. You don't think that simply the establishment of formal elections is the only way. So for U.S. policy what this means, I would hope, we intervene at every point where we can have effective leverage, leverage that creates a kind of positive synergy between state and civil society that Indonesia so desperately requires. That may mean some kind of revisitation of relations between the U.S. and the armed forces but I'm going to defer on that to other persons and another moment.

Woodward: It is the case that domestication of democracy and the articulation of democratic values within an Islamic framework is a necessary condition for a successful democratic transition. I think that work has already largely been accomplished in the writings of people like Gus Dur, Nurcholish Madjid, and a whole host of the other younger Muslim intellectuals. That being said, I think the intellectual foundation is there. I think the problem is that Indonesia is caught in an enormous paradox that two things are required - economic recovery and political stability. As I see it the paradox is we are not going to have economic recovery until we have political stability and we are not going to have political stability until we have economic recovery. So in

terms of policy implications it is not that there has to be an emphasis on civil society and democratic institutions, but there has got to be very real and serious attention paid to reviving the economy and dramatically improving the living status of all those people who have suffered so much during the last few years.

A person from the Poso Watch Network: A former Kuwait minister stated that a small group of radicals hijacked Kuwaiti policy. It is pretty much what is happening in Indonesia now. In fact the demise of the great moderate President Wahid was created by the strategy of small groups. My question is if these groups are so insignificant when do you think Indonesia can start addressing the refugee problem? Many of the non-Muslim refugees fled after all of the jihad movements. So, when is Indonesia likely to address the refugee question?

Hefner: Unfortunately the answer to that very important and urgent question will depend upon the resolution of certain problems of governance and in particular the re-establishment of a nationally coordinated system of local government across the whole of Eastern Indonesia. You don't have that now. Indeed, as we saw most dramatically illustrated in the North Maluku and Halmahera regions, you have still fierce rivalries between different elite coalitions, making the kinds of trolling expeditions that I referred to very briefly in my paper: expeditions into society exploiting ethno-religious divisions to recruit followers. Let us remember that much of the violence in North Maluku was in its inception not Christian versus Muslim, but a certain segment of the Muslim community against a Christian-Muslim coalition. And it was only as a result of great efforts of certain hard-liners on both sides that it crystallized into a clear Christian-Muslim conflict. So the answer to the question goes back once again to the resolution of the crisis of government and the recreation of that vital synergy that you need between state and society. And you need to give up on this romantic 1990s idea that all you need to make democracy work is a strong civil society. For there to be a strong civil society you need an effective government as well.

Azra: I think some progress has been achieved by the Indonesian government in the last several weeks. In the case of violence in Poso, Central Sulawesi for instance, the conflicting parties have achieved the Malino agreement in South Sulawesi. All of the conflicting parties meet with some government ministers and they achieved some ways to resolve the conflict and violence in Central Sulawesi. Of course

the resolution of such conflict not only in Poso but in Maluku needs several faces. The most important thing is to stop violence in a decisive manner among conflicting parties. The second is the social and economic rehabilitation of the area, because one of the most important sources of the conflict is economic competition between the local Christians or local Muslims with the immigrants who are very aggressive in economic enterprises. That is the case in Maluku. I think the conflict environment originated from economic and political reasons: economic competition between local Christians and Buginese or Makassar people who happen to be Muslim. And of course the second reason is a political struggle between the rising Muslim population contesting the domination of the Christian political position in Maluku. So the root causes of the conflict are mainly economic and political, and religion came only later as the rallying point for the conflicting parties to face each other. Important steps that can give us hope have been taken by the government. Last week the conflicting parties in Ambon have been brought also by the government to the negotiating table, also in Malino, to resolve the Maluku and Ambon violence.

Alasdair Bowie, The George Washington University: In the forward to Bob Hefner's well-read book *Civil Islam* he refers to his discomfort about addressing a gathering of NU youths about events that occurred many decades before. Those events in 1965-66 involved the active participation of Muslim groups in the widespread violence following the coup attempt. The reason Bob Hefner was anxious was because he thought he was going to be raked over the coals by these active NU youth for identifying the role of Muslims in that violence. It turned out to be quite the contrary. In fact these youths were very much interested in his work in exposing the fact that Islamic groups were manipulated and used in this process of perpetuating widespread violence. My question is, is it the case today that there is growing outrage among NU youth or other so called mainstream Islamic groups about the fact that Indonesian Islam is being characterized in radical terms, or is it going to take us several decades more before we can look back on that and see outrage emerge?

Hefner: The evidence is that many in the leadership of the Muslim community and indeed in all of the mainstream leaders are deeply upset and concerned about the portrayal of Islam in the Western media, but not merely blaming the Western media for that, but recognizing that the rise of groups like Front Pembela Islam and the Laskar Jihad has tarnished not

only the reputation but the hard-fought achievements of the Muslim community and leadership from the late 1980s to today. There is that concern. This concern was illustrated by a meeting of NU leaders which took place in early December, in which they resolved they wanted to make a protracted effort to take action against Islamic radicals in part to repair this tarnished image. Now this much said at the elite level I would have to say that I have been greatly saddened to see how effective the propaganda of the hard-liners has been in convincing not merely a handful of the people but a significant percentage of the Muslim community and perhaps, most importantly, a significant percentage of the rank and file of the Muhammadiyah that indeed there is a Christian conspiracy at the very least within Indonesia and perhaps with international support; some would say with direct international support from the United States. This impression has filtered out into the community and I have been startled in Yogyakarta and Solo to find very ordinary Muslims, moderate people, who state in a very matter of fact way that the crisis in Maluku was provoked by Christians and the government did nothing. "Of course Wahid sympathized with them and so of course we had to take action." This is saddening. While it is a serious setback for the Muslim community we should not exaggerate it. It again reflects a failure of the government to defend ordinary citizens. Christians and Muslims, both sides have suffered horrendous losses. Given the failure of the government to address what is clearly a pressing need and in these circumstances of economic crisis, we shouldn't be surprised that conspiracy stories of these sorts begin to find some credibility. To respond to your question in brief, I don't think it is going to take decades but it is going to take a resolution of what remains the most vexing crisis in Indonesia, which is not a crisis in the Muslim community, but a crisis in governance that is having an impact on an effectively mobilized and well financed wing of the Muslim community.

SESSION II - The Politics of Islam in a Democratizing Indonesia

Ulil Abshar Abdalla: My focus in this session is the role of Islam in consolidating democracy in Indonesia, keeping in mind that the challenge of consolidating democracy in Indonesia should be directed at three main areas: the economy, the political and the social environments. Keeping this in mind I will confine my presentation to how Islam can play a role in consolidating political democracy in Indonesia.

The most challenging role to be played by Islam is how to give legitimacy to democracy within the theological framework of Islam. I strongly believe democracy in Indonesia will not be strengthened or take a strong root without strong support from the Islamic society. Thus I believe the interpretational effort to Islamic teaching is one of the big challenges to be accomplished by Muslim intellectuals.

In my work in the field I have seen these efforts by Muslim intellectuals especially in my organization, NU. I work for the Department of Research and Human Research Development of NU and I've been working for years promoting modern notions of human rights, democracy and gender equality from an Islamic theological perspective. Some of the work I've done is related to promoting the ideas of pluralism and democracy among the traditional Islamic leaders. As you know most members of NU are based in villages and the leadership is run by traditional Muslim leaders or *kyai*. The character of NU society is based on the patron-client relationship in the sense that the leadership plays a very important role in shaping the minds of their followers. This is how we can explain how the former chairman of NU, President Wahid, played a very important role in strengthening the democratic position and mentality within the NU membership.

In Jakarta my colleagues and I organize many courses and *halaika*, religious circles, devoted to introducing modern notions of democracy and human rights within an Islamic theological framework. It is interesting that this effort is accepted by the NU leadership and the discussion about democracy, human rights and the like is very vibrant among the NU leadership. One of the most important issues is gender equality. My colleagues in NU provide a new interpretation to classical Islamic teaching about the role of women in society within a new gender framework. Two months ago one of the most important women's organizations in Jakarta launched a book that revises and reinterprets the classical books on the role of women in Islam. They call it *Kitab Kuning*, Yellow Book, and it is very popular in Muslim society. This book is on the role of women in Islam. Of course the content of the book is very conservative but it is very influential among the Muslim society in Indonesia. Our work is to provide a new interpretation on the role of women in Islam according to the new issue of gender equality.

In my organization we are working to build a network of liberal Islam. This is a tricky and controversial term but a liberal interpretation of Islam is very crucial and instrumental in strengthening the

ideas of democracy within Muslim society. I'm running a weekly talk show in Jakarta, which is broadcasted to 20 private stations across the country and is also syndicated and published in nearly 15 publications around the country. One example of our work is a weekly column in *Jawa Pos*, among the most popular dailies in Eastern Indonesia. The column discusses the tendency among Muslim society towards pioussness but at the same time a tendency towards exclusionism. We call it more pious but less tolerant. This is one issue that we have written about that is causing controversy among Muslims in Jakarta. Another publication we have is a journal called *Afkar*. The latest edition is on the education of pluralist Islam, an issue that is very hotly discussed among Muslim intellectuals. There is a tendency to believe that Muslim education has recently been hijacked by radical groups to serve a very narrow-minded Islam that is very exclusive and spewing hatred towards other groups. But as these examples prove that is just not true.

A key point I would like to emphasize is that interpretation of Islam is playing a very important role in strengthening democracy amongst Muslims. Of course there are many factors that are needed for recovery in Indonesia, such as the economy and the political situation. But I think the most challenging factors are related to the interpretation of Islam. The battle now within the Muslim society is the battle of mind and interpretation. The issue of pluralism is not an issue of Muslim society against the society outside. Pluralism is an issue within the Muslim society. It is an issue of how Muslims win the minds and hearts of the people in the direction of a more pluralist Islam. I think the hope of pluralist Islam, moderate Islam in my country is very high. In this sense I do believe that due to the economic crisis there are emerging a growing number of radical groups in the country. I believe this is just a temporary situation. The radical groups are not rooted in the minds of society. The orientation of mainstream Muslims is still towards pluralistic Islam. With a strong civilian government and with law enforcement I believe in the near future these radical groups could be moderated.

I believe there is room for liberal, moderate and radical groups. I do not believe the door of dialogue is shut. The door is still open. I agree with Bob Hefner's presentation earlier that figures like Jafar Umar Thalib, the chairman of Laskar Jihad, or Habib Riziq, chairman of the Islamic Defense Group (FPI) are not as radical as people think. I met with Jafar Umar Thalib a few weeks ago at a panel presentation and it was surprising that he spoke very eloquently

about the urgency of dialogue among Christians and Muslims including quoting some Koranic verses about the imperative of these dialogues, referring to the same verses that are often quoted by Nurcholish Madjid and Abdurrahman Wahid. It is curious that a person perceived as a symbol of hatred against Christians in Ambon and Poso is talking very eloquently about dialogue. Of course we could say that this is not a genuine position or standpoint of people like Jafar Umar Thalib. But my conviction is that he is just responding to the temporary situation. The very existence of Laskar Jihad does not signal a permanent situation within the Muslim society. It is just a temporary situation. The argument of figures like Jafar Umar Thalib is that Muslims in Maluku and Poso were under attack by the Christians. As long as Muslims are under attack we have an obligation according to our religion to defend their rights. These are the arguments. Of course we can dispute whether the Muslims are really under attack. But I think this argument is completely understandable. The ideology of jihad is not a genuine ideology for this group. It is only a temporary notion or ideology for this group to cope with a temporary situation.

It is very surprising that groups like Laskar Jihad and *Front Pembela Islam* (FPI) share the idea of the nation state of Indonesia. In all my frequent encounters with these groups I didn't find any notion of their desire for an Islamic state in Indonesia. They agree that Indonesia is a country for all. The only thing that they emphasize is Muslims as the majority have rights to be treated as such. They perceive the Muslim majority as having been treated unfairly during the New Order regime. So what they demand is only to give the Muslims their rights as the majority people. Part of the right they demand is the implementation of Islamic law (*shariah*). I think this issue is debatable and there is room for debate on this issue. Again and again the people in Laskar Jihad and FPI say Islamic *shariah* is an obligation for Muslims but that there is room for debate on the extent to which Islamic *shariah* should be implemented in Indonesia. I do not think the situation is as gloomy as people think outside Indonesia. I believe this group is just a product of a temporary situation. It is not permanent. With greater freedom and strong democratic institutions I believe this group will wither away sooner or later.

Lies Marcoes Natsir: In my opinion, talking about women in Islam is more than relevant not only because Islam is a religion with very significant detail in formulating and prescribing relations between men and women, the social positions of men and women, but also because in a society like

Indonesia that considers religion an essential component of life, a woman's position in Islam can be used as a barometer of the Islamic value of democracy.

In the western media Islam is often stereotyped as a repressive and oppressive religion. To prove this point, sometimes women's conditions in certain situations under so-called Islamic rule are described without any understanding of the context in which the situation is happening. Through the media we are often tainted with images, for instance, of women forced to wear the veil, the *hijab* or the *jalabah*, or *abayah*, or descriptions of restrictions of women in the public sphere. For us in Indonesia, this image is very strange. I'm not saying that women's situation in Indonesia is better than in other Islamic countries. But like other women in Islamic countries, it might also be said of women in the Hindu religion, in India, or women in Buddhist China, Vietnam or Thailand, or even a Catholic for instance in the Philippines or Ghana. The greatest problems for women in Indonesia are related to the lack of education, a lack of social and economic resources and a lack of political power. These problems arise in Indonesia for several reasons including a male bias in the interpretation of religion that is the source of our ideas on the role of men and women.

I wish to share with you what Muslim women are doing in Indonesia in the development of the awareness and public discourse about women's rights and what precisely the issues are that are relevant and exist in Indonesia today. For more than ten years, I have been working for an NGO called P3M, the Indonesian Society for *Pesantren* and Community Development. As Pak Azyumardi already mentioned a *pesantren* is a traditional Islamic boarding school. There are more than 10,000 *pesantren* in Indonesia. Most of the *pesantren* are located in rural areas in Java and Madura where more than 70% of the entire Indonesian Muslim population lives. Normally a *pesantren* is led by a *kyai* but recently there are some *pesantren* led by an *ibu kyai*. An *ibu kyai* is the wife or the daughter of a *kyai*. In Indonesia, we consider the *pesantren* as the subculture of Islam. In the *pesantren* we find a unique cultural atmosphere created over long periods of interaction and interconnection between Islamic teachings, Javanese feudal and hierarchical systems, Hindu *ashram* educational systems as well as the traditions of agrarian society. As for the political and social organization, most of the Javanese *pesantren* are affiliated with NU. This is easy to understand because NU was established by a *kyai*, a traditional Islamic leader in the *pesantren* society. NU was

therefore also established as a vehicle for political aspirations of the *kyai*.

Our main activities in the advocacy of women's rights in Islam include reproductive rights and political rights in both the domestic and public spheres. The advocacy of reproductive rights within Islam in Indonesia is contextually relevant not only because Indonesia has the highest incidence of maternal mortality in Asia but also because ninety percent of Indonesia's 200 million inhabitants are Muslim. So the ideas of the Islamic community and its leaders are particularly relevant when addressing a woman's well being. This is especially true today due to the increasing politicization of Islam and the fact that religious leaders play an increasing role in influencing government policies and programs. This is more or less the arena in which Islamic women activists have to play.

After ten years of raising the general awareness about Muslim women issues through workshops, seminars, and distributing books and publications, we began to wonder to what extent we had had an impact upon the dominant discourse regarding women's rule and the position in the *pesantren* as well as in the larger NU circle. We conducted several studies to determine the impact of our work. In my opinion the female leadership issues within Islam in Indonesia are relevant today because not only do we have a female president, but there are new developments related to female leadership within Islam. For instance, two weeks ago, the Muhammadiyah Congress in Bali came up with a very progressive decree that women could be elected into leadership positions. Normally women could only be elected as a wing of Muhammadiyah in Asia but now Muhammadiyah has decided that females could be elected as Muhammadiyah leaders.

If you look at the historical background of the issue of female leadership we see that the theological discussion concerning female political leadership in Indonesia developed after two women came to the political forefront. They were Mbak Tutut (Siti Hardiyanti Indra Rukmana) and Ibu Megawati. At the time, Tutut, the eldest daughter of Soeharto, was representing the ruling party, Golkar, while Megawati was representing the opposition party, PDI, and was supported by the masses of ordinary people. Before that the discussion concerning female leadership according to Islamic teaching in Indonesia was only held within the context of theological discussions. The issue of female leadership received serious attention also after NU held its national congress of ulama, *Munas Ulama* in Lombok in

1997. At this *Munas*, NU issued a very progressive *fatwa* declaring that there was no religious prohibition against women assuming the position of head of state. However, this progressive *fatwa* seemed to be nullified a year later by the Congress of Indonesian Ulema (KUI) in which NU also played a great role in addition to other Islamic organizations such as Muhammadiyah as well as some fundamentalist organizations. This KUI recommended that women should not be permitted to become head of state because according to the majority of the opinion in Islam, it's against Islamic teaching. What is more interesting is that before Megawati became part of the government as a vice president of Abdurrahman Wahid, the majority of Indonesian Islamic politicians, mostly men, flatly rejected the idea of a woman as head of state, but later they seemed to be of a different opinion. This became clear after one of the Muhammadiyah leaders encountered Megawati and declared that according to Muhammadiyah's views there is no restriction in Islam against women being leaders. This declaration was then followed by a statement made by several other Islamic organizations in *Al-Azhar* mosque in Jakarta in February 2001 which said that it is not prohibited within Islam to have a woman as head of state.

So what was the background for these contradictory *fatwa*? One may be struck by the significant role NU played in the political game relating to women's leadership. The context of the Lombok *fatwa* must have been linked to Golkar's hidden campaign to promote Tutut as the presidential candidate. At the time Gus Dur said Tutut would be the leader for the future. The KUI statement appears to have been related to inhibiting Megawati's progress in her presidential nomination whereas the *Al-Azhar* Mosque declaration was related to Indonesian political parties in their efforts to support Megawati and to undermine Abdurrahman Wahid's position as the president. From this it becomes clear that NU, Muhammadiyah and other Islamic political organizations created a case of political bargaining by providing religious support for the possibility of a woman head of state in one moment and withholding it in the next. Through their claim that they have legitimacy to talk about *fatwa*, they were capable for providing religious support either for or against the idea of a woman head of state. In conclusion I would like to say that the issue of female political leadership within Islam in an Indonesian context does not have much to do with religious judgments, the *halal* and *haram*, but rather male Islamic political interests. This shows us that as long as Muslim women have no power and legitimacy to talk about their position

within Islam, they will remain in subordinate positions in society. They will remain an object of regulation.

I wish to discuss a few activities conducted by Islamic women to develop their rights. The older Islamic organizations that are most active in rural areas are affiliated with NU. Another organization is ICI, the women's organization affiliated with Muhammadiyah. ICI have organized a variety of religious activities but they have also set up a limited number of programs for women in development, mostly in the fields of education, health and small-scale finance. In the field of formal education however, ICI has established a relatively wide network of vocational education centers and claims to have a large number of members. *Fatayat* is regarded by NU as an organization for young Muslim women with an estimated 6 million members and seems to offer more progressive schemes and programs. Since 1997 *fatayat* has included in its traditional activities, like health and nutrition, the advocacy of women in empowerment issues and women's political participation. New women's organizations have also developed within the past few years such as *Forum Kajian Kitab Klasik Islam* that Ulil mentioned before, Forum for the Study for Classical Islamic Texts. This group was established in Jakarta in 1997 by a number of progressive men and women activists, Islamic and religious specialists as well as sociologists, anthropologists, gender-specialists and other professionals, attempting to formulate reinterpretation of the classical Islamic texts pertaining to the right and responsibility of men and women, through study group discussions.

The massive riots in Jakarta in May 1998 were followed by acts of sexual violence against women, in particular Chinese women. This development resulted in the establishment of the *Sutra Women's Organization*, to focus specifically on the issue of violence against women. *Sauda Puan Amal Hayati* is one of the women's Muslim organizations advocating women's rights within Islam and to reduce violence against women. The aim uniting all these new organizations is women empowerment and the advocacy of women's rights within Islam and within the context of Islamic teaching. This has come to include addressing a number of complex and sensitive issues such as abortion. Efforts have also been made to formulate less gender-bias and less discrimination in the interpretation of religion. This example illustrates the great differences that exist between the stereotype of women in Islam and the reality of many Islamic women in Indonesia today.

Greg Fealy: I want to talk largely about Indonesian and Islamic political parties and I speak here as a political historian and one who has done quite a bit of research on the 1950s when Indonesia had its first encounter with parliamentary democracy. This is a rather unfashionable area and indeed a lot of Indonesians tend to be dismissive or disdainful of this period of Indonesian history, but I think some interesting lessons can be learned about Indonesia's current experience with democracy. I will mention three brief conclusions that one might draw in comparing democracy, particularly the function of political parties now in Indonesia, to the 1950s.

The first is that individuals are far more dominant now than they were in the 1950s. Megawati, Amien Rais, and Abdurrahman Wahid dominate their respective parties. Their ability to dictate terms to those parties has no parallel in the 1950s. There were important figures in the 1950s but they were not people who could bend an entire party to their will. There's something cultic and iconic in the status that those three have within their respective parties.

The second element is the demise of ideology. This is not of course unique to Indonesia, but I think it's more graphically illustrated in Indonesia than in many other countries. Every major party in the 1950s had its ideology. Party conferences were dominated by very intense ideological debates. There was a lot of space in party publications given to discussion of ideological issues. We see very little of this in the 1990s.

The third factor is the far greater presence of "money politics", to coin the popular Indonesian term, the purchasing of positions and influence between parties, and also physical intimidation. To my knowledge, no 1950s political party had a paramilitary wing. Virtually every major Indonesian party today has a paramilitary wing, the membership of which can range from people who are very committed, well-trained cadre to people who are no better than thugs and semi-criminals. Unfortunately it tends to be more of the hooligan element which is evident in some of the larger parties such as the PDI-P. There was far less purchasing of positions in the 1950s than there is now.

I mention these things to give some sort of context in which we might see the performance of Indonesian Islamic political parties since the fall of Soeharto. Exactly how many Islamic political parties there are depends on how tightly you wish to define the term. There are parties that have Islam as their formal basis; you might call them formalist parties. There

are also parties that are based on Pancasila, the quasi-secular national ideology, but whose support base comes overwhelmingly from the Islamic community.

I'm going to concentrate on the five main Islamic political parties: The National Awakening Party of Abdurrahman Wahid, or PKB (Partai Kebangkitan Bangsa); the PPP or United Development Party led by the current vice president Hamzah Haz; Amien Rais's National Mandate Party or PAN; and the current justice minister, Yusril Ihza Mahendra, heading the fourth largest party, Bulan Bintang or Crescent and Star Party; and last is the Justice Party or Partai Keadilan. Of these, PKB, Gus Dur's party, got the largest vote in the 1999 elections, about 12.6%, the PPP 11.7%, PAN 7.4%, the Crescent Star Party 1.9% and PK, the Justice Party, 1.7%. So it's quite a substantial block of the vote.

I want to look at these five parties in terms of what we would expect them to be doing in a consolidating democracy. Of course political parties are a vital part of consolidating a democracy. I'm looking at a number of indicators to tell us whether the state of these Islamic parties is healthy or not, whether they're going to be able to contribute in a positive way to the democratization process. I have four indicators I would like to share.

First is rising levels of branch activity and participation of members in party affairs. The second would be a systematic cadreization process taking place within these parties which would allow the most talented and committed of the members to rise to leadership positions. The third indicator would be improved internal communications and decision-making processes of party leaders informing grassroots members of their policy positions and decisions, and the members giving their input to this process; a two-way communication between the party elite and the grassroots. A fourth indicator would be the development of well thought out and detailed policy platforms, if not ideological platforms.

Unfortunately the answers to these indicators when looking at Islamic parties is they are doing rather poorly. In fact this is going to be a somewhat pessimistic presentation, at least looking at short-term factors.

On the first factor, branch level activity, a great many political parties are moribund at the branch level. These parties are showing indications of being only election parties. They gear up for the quinquennial elections and in between times there is minimal

branch activity. This means a small number of elite are able to control the affairs of the party.

The second element, of cadreization, is also not promising. Promotions and advancement are more often based upon access to money and patronage. You can be very bright, very hardworking but if you don't have a lot of money to buy support or a very powerful patron in the organization you are unlikely to go very far at all. The only exception to this is the Justice Party, the Partai Keadilan, which is a genuine cadre party. It has very rigorous rules which apply to advancement of people from within its ranks and it has some very impressive people at the top who are not wealthy and who have not pulled clientelist strings to get where they are.

Third, internal communications within the parties are very poor, there is little flow of paperwork, there is little use of electronic media to communicate decisions down to the grassroots. Indeed there is little interest in what grassroots opinion is among party leadership. If one looked at recent party congresses and national conferences, they have been very tightly staged, managed events creating very little substantive debate on key policy issues.

The last element, well thought out policy platforms: very few parties had detailed policy platforms in the 1999 elections, and there has been very little work done in any of the parties since then to develop a sophisticated set of policies.

The Islamic political parties are ripe with clientelism, inclined towards populism and also shot through with corruption. We are not seeing Islamic political parties which are more cohesive, and which are more effective at aggregating, expressing and protecting community and national interests. The only party which might be an exception to this is the Justice Party but this is a very small party. It has seven seats in the parliament of 500 people.

I want to look at three particular issues with regard to these Islamic parties. First is their fragmentation, second is their leadership problems, and the third is their stance on ideology.

The first, fragmentation: four of the five parties are beset with serious internal divisions. In the case of PKB, Gus Dur's party, there is now a breakaway party – not strictly speaking a breakaway party, it legally is PKB – led by the current defense minister Matori Abdul Djalil. And it is quite likely that Gus Dur's version of PKB would have to bear another name in the next election, a slightly altered name

such as PKB-Struggle or something like that. But Matori's version will be the party that probably struggles in the polls. But in any case, that's quite a serious split within PKB. Perhaps the most serious split of all is within the PPP. Recently PPP, a reform PPP, P3 Reformasi, was formed by the most popular preacher in Indonesia, Zainuddin MZ, the nearest thing Indonesia has to a televangelist. He's a rather shallow political leader I suspect, but he's a very effective communicator. He is very effective at using the electronic media and has wide grassroots support across Indonesia in the Islamic community. So that poses very serious threat to the second most important party in the ruling coalition.

The Crescent Star Party, the Bulan Bintang Party of Yusril Ihza Mahendra, had a serious split in its congress in 2000. And I suspect there're more splits on the way. Yusril himself is both feared and loathed by many of the executive members and many branches in the party. But he maintains an iron grip over the functioning of the party. Last of all there's Amien Rais's PAN. We saw the defection of a number of so-called secular Muslim politicians and non-Muslim politicians a number of months ago, including Faisal Basri and Bara Hasibuan. There may well be more defections on the way as PAN comes to terms with just how Islamic or open it's going to be in its ideology.

The interesting thing in all these splits is that personalities feature more prominently than policy or ideological debates. The worrying thing about this fragmentation is that it greatly reduces the effectiveness of the parties in the national, provincial and in the local political sphere. It means they are concentrating on internal splits rather than concentrating on larger macro policy issues. A number of commentators have also pointed out that the proliferation of splits within parties also reduces their effectiveness to provide a counter-opposition to a number of other forces in the political system, be it the military or bureaucracy.

I think it's safe to conclude from this that Indonesian politics, Islamic politics, is more divided now than at any time in Indonesia's political history since 1945. Indeed, when the government called on Islamic parties to form in 1949 after the War of Independence, all Islamic groups agreed to form just one political party. You might compare that with the 21 political parties that contested the last election, and there may well be more that try to contest the next election.

Second, I want to look at elements of leadership and my theme here is how disappointing key Islamic political leaders have been, people who were standard-bearers for the reform process. Now I'm not judging them as disappointing here in any normative sense or imposing my own agenda on them. Merely a matter of measuring how they have lived up to the claims that they were making in the pre-Soeharto, or immediate post-Soeharto era. The first one to look at is Abdurrahman Wahid himself. He was the great hope of Islamic democratization in the 1980s and the 1990s. I don't want to dwell much on his presidency. I think most of you are aware of what a shambolic affair it was. But I want to comment on his role within PKB. I really have come to view him as the main obstacle to internal reform within PKB and PKB becoming an internally democratic party. He is constantly undermining democratic processes in the party by dictating terms at party meetings and hand-picking the people he wants for key roles. This is very disappointing for a man who spent much of the 1980s talking about how he was trying to *mendewasakan nahdliyyin*, how he was trying to encourage NU members to be mature about the decisions they made, informing them and allowing them to make their own decisions. Instead he has constantly preempted those decisions, those democratic processes within PKB. And more than any other party, arguably even Mega's PDI-P, this has become Gus Dur's party, where virtually nothing can get through without his approval. I think the gap between his rhetoric and action, which was pretty large during his presidency, is even more yawning if you look at what's happening within PKB.

Similarly with Amien Rais, the great chameleon of Indonesian politics, we can see someone who can at one time be statesman-like, a leader, an eloquent advocate for reform and pluralism, and at other times can be sectarian, anti-Semitic, anti-Chinese, anti-Western and can be very bigoted. But since late 1998 Amien has cast his lot with the pluralists and he set PAN up as an open party. It's a party which all Indonesians are welcome to join. He made sure in the early stages of PAN that there were always non-Muslims, not only on the boards, the national level, but also on the local level. Now after PAN's disappointing electoral performance in 1999, Amien has pursued this with less rigor. There's only one of the 34-35 PAN members of the parliament who is a non-Muslim. Most of them are from a Muhammadiyah background, an organization that Amien Rais used to head. Many of the local boards now have either driven out or sidelined non-Muslims in their ranks. So what started off as an open, pluralist party is now increasingly becoming more of

a Muhammadiyah party. Many people within PAN who championed this sort of openness feel betrayed by Amien Rais's more recent actions.

I could talk about other parties, but I won't. I just wanted to mention something about ideology because there has been some talk about this and Ulil mentioned the Islamic state issue. For the more doctrinaire Islamic parties such as PPP and Bulan Bintang, the great cause in the last few years has been the so-called Jakarta Charter. The Jakarta Charter is made up of seven key words that would in effect oblige Muslims to implement *shariah*, Islamic law. This is a long constitutional debate in Indonesian history which goes back to the formation of the state. These two parties have been championing the return of the Jakarta Charter to the Constitution, in particular Section 29 of the Constitution.

It's interesting to look in some detail at how this is taking place. In the case of Bulan Bintang, the Crescent Star party, this has been a long-held position. This is a very doctrinaire party and I think it's a very sincere wish they have. In the case of the United Development Party I think it's somewhat more cynical. But they're championing this for all that they're worth. The interesting thing is to look at the intellectual activity underlining this political campaign and this is very hollow indeed. There are very few texts where people spell out in any detail how they intend to implement this. Even within parties there is an avoidance of detailed examination about how this might be implemented in practice. For example, in the Crescent Star party you'll find probably about half of the board members are adamant that any *shariah* rule should oblige Muslim women to wear headaddress, to wear the *jilbab*. But the party chairman and more than a few of the party leaders adamantly think that this should not be included. Even this basic issue has not been threshed out within the party, and yet they are proposing to put in the Constitution something that has not been thoroughly worked out in detail. So there is something hollow about this ideological debate. There is something symbolic about the Jakarta Charter but as a prescription for how Muslims should lead their life, it is very disappointing for people who claim to be ideological Muslims not to have pursued this in greater detail.

In closing, it's too early to say whether some of these problems may be resolved by the 2004 election. In the post-2004 election we may see some genuine consolidation, but unfortunately we don't have many case studies to compare with. We could look at Turkey, for example, and see some of these elements

appearing after a couple of coups and they still have not been resolved. They have been followed by subsequent military coups. So at the moment, it's very fluid and hazardous in Indonesia. It is difficult to guess how things might be resolved, because it is also partly dependent on how and what legislative changes come about in parliament.

But, despite the widespread media coverage particularly in the West about rising fundamentalism, the evidence from the 1999 election is that about three quarters of Muslims voted for pluralist parties. This is not just those people that voted for the five parties I mentioned earlier. Looking at the vote for a party such as Golkar, it's likely as far as I can work out, the single largest block of modernist votes went to Golkar. If you look where the vote came from this is where modernist leanings are strong. And Golkar is not, by most definitions, an Islamic party. The great majority of Indonesian Muslims, people who according to their citizenship cards profess Islamic faith, a great majority of them voted for parties that were not formalist in their Islamic beliefs or had Islamic agendas. And despite the publicity given to Laskar Jihad, there's little to suggest that those more Islamic parties have increased in support to a great extent. For example, the last two attempts to get the Jakarta Charter raised in the People's Consultative Assembly have been defeated by large majorities.

So the picture I'm painting for these Islamic parties in the short-term is not particularly bright. The closing point I might make is about the importance here of NGOs, of the press and the various other liberal organizations, and intellectuals who provide a critique of this process. There are sections in the press that are now making a specialization of this. The journal *GAMMA* is doing a very good job of exposing corruption and double standards within the political parties and the like. *Tempo* and *Gatra* are also doing a good job of this as well as NGOs that are doing research into political parties. I think this is very important if we are to have some sort of corrective influence on the clientelism that we see emerging or being strengthened within political parties at the moment.

Session II Discussion

Robert Barry, former ambassador to Indonesia: Much of what Greg Fealy was talking about sounds a lot like the former Yugoslavia. I have an assertion to make, which is you can never get to more competent governance, or to a civil society, within the framework of the existing electoral system in Indonesia. And failing reform of the electoral system

and the constitutional structure which creates it, we're going to continue in a cycle of one-man parties, fractionalization and lack of responsiveness. I ask particularly Greg Fealy to respond to this.

Fealy: That's an interesting question you raised about the electoral system and whether this will have a debilitating effect on the consolidation of democracy and civil society. I can understand why people would believe that to be the case. And I think your reference to the electoral system implies that until Indonesia gets a district system you will not have proper accountability, and under this awkward mixture between the district and proportional systems that we have now, that it still gives too much power to the regional and in particular, national boards of the party. I accept that point entirely and I think the current hybrid system has failed to provide a measure of district representation which was originally intended. There is a particular problem here, namely: it will require enormous effort to install a district system. To draw up the boundaries and to get the parties geared up for district systems, this is not something that can take place within a period of 4 to 5 years, or so I have been informed by electoral specialists including by the KPU, the Indonesian electoral commission. There's also the accompanying issue of what happens if the electoral system isn't properly implemented at a time when there is great tension and a lot of conflict in the country. An ineffective introduction of the district system could lead to an increased level of violence. This is not an argument I'm necessarily drawn to but I can understand why people see this as a legitimate reason to maintain the present system, as cumbersome as it is, for the short term.

As to the Constitution you're making reference to the need for Constitutional change, and I gather this is a reference to whether they should have a parliamentary or presidential system in Indonesia. At the moment they have something of a hybrid system, and the pendulum has swung toward a parliamentary system with the last two constitutional changes that have taken place. Gus Dur used to make a lot of noise about how he was frustrated with parliament and that Indonesia wasn't a pure presidential system. But I certainly don't think Indonesia ever had a purely presidential system. Most of the problems he faced, Mega is also complaining about, including an obstructive parliament. Most of the core problems of government lay elsewhere. Parliament contributed to those, but those are not the reason that Gus Dur and his government failed on so many fronts. And they are also not the reason why this present government is performing so poorly. Many of the

issues come back to the inability of ministers to make decisions, of the cabinet to function effectively, or the bureaucracy to implement the decisions that have been made. I'm not convinced that swinging the balance back to the presidency, back towards the executive, or indeed going to a full parliamentary system would necessarily change consolidation of democracy. It's more about how those in the executive government are functioning. I have lots of qualms with the way parliament is functioning as well and I think that's another reason to be rather depressed at recent trends. But I don't think it's a constitutional setting as such, it's something that comes back to culture and political culture, the openness of it and balancing between various forces.

Dennis Halpin, House International Relations Committee: My question is for Dr. Marcoes Natsir, as a Islamic woman involved in working for gender equality, I have a question about recent issues with the Taliban, the liberation of Afghanistan and the [American] president's statements in the State of the Union address. The West has a long history of being pushy in advocating cultural, political and religious values in other cultures. When Western political leaders make comments about women's rights in the universal issue of human rights, is this helpful or counterproductive to your work? Does it help you or does it seem like interference?

Natsir: I think the majority of women organizations in Indonesia including women Moslem activists are against the ideas of the Taliban because they tend to marginalize the space for woman in the public sphere. This is contrary to experience in Indonesia. Traditionally Indonesians have had wide room for woman in the public sphere. Regarding the context of *jilbab* we have a different interpretations about that. I do not believe the *jilbab* is associated with radicalism, or what happened in Afghanistan. In Indonesia we use *jilbab* as part of the fashion. We also see it used as a symbol of freedom for woman. But if you look at the historical background of the emerging of the *jilbab* you will see it began after the revolution in Iran. But then contextually it became very different, in particular after the daughter of Soeharto, Tutut wore the *jilbab* after she went to Mecca. Since then the *jilbab* has become very fashionable for middle-class women, in particular among the civil servants. So it's completely different. But indeed sometimes there are political forces that drive the wearing of the *jilbab*, for instance, Partai Keadilan, those women always wear the *jilbab*.

With regard to the Western pressure I would say it has a negative influence on our work because it creates a situation of confrontation between the West and the East, and Islam and the West. But this may be in part because we make gender analysis based on tools from the West.

Abdalla: I have a point to add about the Western image and the Taliban's treatment of women. Talibanism in general is not popular among Muslims in Indonesia. We view their treatment of women as quite strange. On several occasions the chairman of one of the most important Islamic parties, the Justice Party, has said that the party supports the right of women to participate in the public sphere. And they demonstrate this by having a woman represent their party in parliament. And from my conversation with the leadership of Laskar Jihad and FPI, there is no evidence that women should be prevented from participating in the public sphere. So I think Talibanism is quite peculiar to the Afghanistan social context.

Oscar Zaky, Indonesian Muslim Association in America: My question is for Ulil and Lies Marcoes. You said you're promoting a modern notion of human rights and democracy and its interpretation in Islam. How do you define modern? Is it based on Western values, or Islamic? I think Islam defines everything clearly, not just socially, politically, and economically but everything.

You were also saying that you were promoting gender equality. Where do you see gender inequality in Islam? If you are promoting gender equality does that mean there is gender inequality?

Abdalla: The first question about how you define modernity and how you reconcile Islam and modernity. A lot of Muslim intellectuals believe that there are a lot of things in common between Islam and modern notions of democracy. Only a few Muslims believe there is a complete contradiction between democracy and Islam. One such group is *Hizb al-Tahrir*, mentioned by Bob Hefner. *Hizb al-Tahrir* is a small group which is of the opinion that democracy is totally un-Islamic because democracy is based on the belief that sovereignty rests with the people while Islam is based on the belief that sovereignty rests with God. So it is inconceivable that Islam and democracy could be reconciled. Please recall that this is a small group who are not very influential. I think the majority of the Muslim intellectuals believe there are universal values shared by Islam and modern notions of democracy. I do not think the question how you define modernity is

relevant because there are commonalities and universal values that are shared by Islam and modern values. Of course there are some values in modern democracy that are not supported by Islam, but I think in general, Islam and democracy are not contradictions.

Natsir: Within Islam women in Indonesia don't bother with equality and equity. What we are trying to do is to talk about gender and justice within Islam because the value of Islam in particular within the *shariah* law within the *fiqh* is very gender-biased. That is why we are trying to develop our interpretation based on female perspectives and experiences. I think this is the difference between the ideas of gender in the West and in Indonesia, particularly among Moslem activists.

Rick Kraince, Ohio University: I have a question for Ulil and this relates to Laskar Jihad. Ulil, you mentioned that you are involved in a newspaper syndication and radio effort which promotes civil democracy through an Islamic framework. I also notice recently that some of the Islamic journals have reacted to some of this discourse that you've been involved with. And in fact I see that the Laskar Jihad journal mentions that you had said that in person Jafar was quite congenial and talking about inter-religious dialogue and I'm wondering what about the rhetoric he presents to his groups out in Poso and Ambon. Have you looked at that and I'm wondering what their reaction is to your work?

Abdalla: Regarding the reaction to moderate Islam project in Indonesia, it is true that recently there has been harsh criticism of my projects to promote liberal Islam and moderate pluralist Islam. But as I mentioned before I'm optimistic that there are tendencies toward moderation because there is space for dialogues. I think the key element in overcoming this confrontation is to increase communication between pluralist Islam and radical Islam. I was very happy when some people from these radical groups came to invite me to attend their meeting and share with them some of my ideas. This is very important in moderating the ideas because some points are not clear for these people. For example the issue of the implementation of Islamic *shariah*. I say to people that I do not oppose Islamic *shariah*, what I oppose is the classical or conservative notion of Islamic *shariah* which in some ways is in contradiction with some of the modern notions of human rights. For example, freedom of expression and freedom of thinking are very crucial because some people still believe in the classical notion of apostasy. That is, people who think contrary to orthodox Islam could be

accused of being apostate and the penalty is death. This is crucial for pluralist societies like Indonesia so I think if we can clarify some point in Islamic *shariah*, I think we can convince these people that we need a new interpretation of Islamic *shariah* in a different context.

LUNCH SESSION

Doug Ramage: I will be speaking about U.S.-Indonesia relations but in a very narrow context. One thing that has been of greatest concern to Americans and to a lot of our Indonesian friends since September 11 has been the perceived rise of anti-Americanism in Indonesia. I want to address that and somehow account for that and offer some tentative conclusions about what it's meant and how serious it was, or is.

My talk is really structured around three broad questions. Why was there seemingly a rapid rise in anti-American sentiment in Indonesia following the September 11 terrorist attacks on the United States? And what, if anything, did this apparent rise in anti-American sentiment have to do with Islam? I'm speaking of the events in Indonesia which filled the press with anti-American rhetoric, threats to harm Americans including Ambassador Gelbard, threats to expel Americans from Indonesia and a general domination of public debate, particularly in the print media, by apparently radical or extremist Islamic organizations. Does all this depict an Indonesia no longer hospitable to Americans or an Indonesian Muslim community seemingly arrayed against the United States or American interests?

Before I get into that in somewhat clinical detail, and before I pose a few tentative answers to those questions, let me recount the immediate reaction to September 11 in Indonesia. Immediately after the September 11 attacks on the United States, Indonesians responded with enormous sympathy and shock and conveyed their condolences to Americans wherever they may be, to private American businesses, to the American Embassy, to the Ambassador, to American institutions including the Ford Foundation, the Asia Foundation and others. In fact, it was a swift and spontaneous response from many Indonesians. The first person to contact the Asia Foundation was in fact Malik Musa, the head of the Muhammadiyah Youth Organization in Aceh, an individual who himself has suffered greatly in the violence and terrorism in his homeland of Aceh for months and years. Many others called, sent e-mails, even dropped by our foundation's office in Jakarta

just to say they cared or were thinking about Americans.

But then something else happened. And that was Indonesian speculation on why the September 11 attacks on United States occurred. And much of the early analysis of the press focused on what is generally believed in Indonesia to be America's wrong-headed and deeply flawed foreign policy in the Middle East. And while Indonesians were already moving on to such analysis of what the context may have been by say September 14, 15 or 16, the American community was still in a state of shock and mourning. The American community was not necessarily prepared to listen to an analysis of how wrong or flawed our foreign policy was. Accentuating the problem was often the gross misunderstanding of the United States which became so evident after September 11. Almost unknown to Indonesians was any information about the growth and vitality of Islam in the United States, the diversity and vibrancy of religious life in our own country, thus leading many Indonesians to believe the statement of a prominent Indonesian who said that the attacks occurred, and I quote "because America hates Muslims and demonizes Islam."

As this analysis regarding the U.S. foreign policy began to come out, Americans began to believe Indonesians were not reacting with sufficient public expressions of grief or solidarity with the Americans and this was compared very quickly and unfavorably to American friends elsewhere in Southeast Asia, to the Philippines, to Thailand, and around the world. So what emerged then by the second week or so after the attack, is what I now see as a real grief gap between Americans and Indonesians. I think many people in the American community began to feel that Indonesians didn't fully empathize because they had moved on to this analysis of why they think this happened. There were plenty of comparison in private and a bit of lamenting about why Indonesians didn't sound more like Gloria Arroyo, or Surin Pitsuan of Thailand or Tony Blair or Schroeder in Europe.

One of the things we can't underestimate in the post September 11 period is the role of a free press in Indonesia. The press in fact had a field day printing the most virulent attacks on the U.S. by the most minor or marginal figures in the Muslim community, accounts of the most conspiratorial nature. One of the notions repeated often was the bizarre contention that the United States or Israel attacked the World Trade Centers themselves so that they could forever blame it on Islam and demonize Muslims. This was

repeated not only in the electronic press but on websites and throughout the papers and so on. I think what also can't be overemphasized was that Americans had never seen a down side to Indonesia's free press. The Indonesian media is now among the most free and open and most dynamic in all of Asia. And that has been a consistent trend since the fall of Soeharto and the beginning of the democratization process since 1998. It is also entirely privately owned and for profit. For the dozens of newspapers, weeklies, tabloids, newspaper syndicates and half dozen or more private television stations it was advertising gold to capture the most readers or audience with the most sensationalist, outrageous coverage possible.

Yet as weeks passed and we approached the end of September it also became clear the attacks were no longer viewed in terms of U.S. foreign policy problems. They had become domesticized. By late September early October when President Megawati returned to Indonesia from a two week trip to the U.S. and Japan what had become the order of the day was the manipulation of the attacks and Indonesia's initial response to it as a way to attack Megawati or tear down her government or question her leadership. By the time she returned to Indonesia in late September domestic political imperatives and maneuvering had taken over completely. Indeed, the single most important factor in the degree to which anti-Americanism was being exploited was to destabilized Megawati's government. I believe she was bewildered by the severity of these attacks when she returned to Indonesia. Illustrating this was a comment from a very senior Golkar politician who told me that the September 11 tragedy "is the opening salvo of Indonesia's 2004 presidential campaign."

Now how are the September 11 terrorist attacks on the U.S. used and by whom? As many of you know while Megawati was here in Washington, DC she gave an extremely well received speech at a USINDO event, and she had a good reception here and a meeting with President Bush in the White House. When she came back to Indonesia she was attacked from the right and the left. The Islamic right used the tragedy to attack Megawati's Islamic credentials, something that has come up again and again in her career. Her visit with President Bush, in which she pledged general support and sympathy to the U.S., was interpreted in the Indonesian press as her having betrayed Islam. By portraying Megawati as close to Americans some of her political opponents hoped this would weaken her appeal to the Muslim masses, who supposedly associated America as being against Islam. On the other hand the

nationalist left attacked her for selling out the country because of her appeal to American investors at the Houston energy conference she attended where she also gave an extremely well received speech pledging the openness of Indonesia's economy and basically saying 'Indonesia is open for business and you all should come.' That was also very sharply attacked by the secular nationalist left in Indonesia. At a time when Americans were wondering why Indonesia was not joining in a very public way the war on terrorism, the press was attacking her quite viciously by depicting her as having an American heart. I recall two editions of *Rakyat Merdeka*, the number two best selling paper in the country. The first was a photo of President Megawati meeting President Bush in the White House. The paper's caption decried this as betraying Islam. The second in early October showed a cartoon of Megawati with her heart revealed as the stars and stripes rather than the red and white flag of Indonesia. I think this is probably not known to most of us, that she was quite seriously attacked for being a lackey of the Americans and being to pro-American.

So why did all this matter and why did this seem to paralyze her in terms of what she could do vis-à-vis a war on terrorism? Primarily because Megawati leads a weak coalition government. She had chosen to bring the Muslim parties into governing with her by choosing Hamzah Haz as her vice president. Within her own secular nationalistic party she must contend with the nationalist left which is concerned with issues of economic nationalism and preventing foreign intervention in Indonesia's economy. She was trying to balance all of these issues. Thus I believe her domestic room for expressing support to the U.S. was very limited.

Now, how did she eventually deal with the criticism against her post September 11? Eventually she made a speech on the eve of a prominent Muslim holiday in which she criticized the spilling of blood to avenge the spilling of blood. This was not particularly well received by Americans but the impact of her speech was very interesting domestically. It gave cover to those who otherwise more or less prepared to defend her and it pointed once again to her renewed Islamic credentials. As soon as this speech was over many prominent leaders said "She is a national leader and she cares about the *ummah*," and following this speech some of the more strident criticism did begin to fall off.

If we run down a number of the expressions of Anti-Americanism we can come to a number of conclusions. First, anti-Americanism initially related

to Indonesian rejection of U.S. foreign policy in the Middle East. As in the Gulf War this is occasionally expressed in the street and press, the difference being that during the Gulf War Indonesia did not have a free press so expressions were very tightly controlled by the Soeharto regime. On the other hand, because the Palestinian cause is not something that is felt deeply and daily by Indonesians, such concerns, though widespread, are not very deep seated and they are rarely expressed. In other words, dislike of this particular dimension of U.S. foreign policy in the Middle East does not animate the general world view of Indonesians or leaders to a significant degree. But because there is a perception that somehow our foreign policy brought on the September 11 attacks it was of course extremely uncomfortable from an American point of view.

There is also a broader issue on Indonesian foreign policy. There is genuine rejection of unilateralism in international affairs by any of the major powers. There is a constitutional mandate in Indonesia to maintain an independent and active foreign policy. I think this also informs their immediate rejection of the American campaign in Afghanistan. But reiterating something which has been said this morning, rejection of U.S. foreign policy in the Middle East does not translate and has not translated into widespread hostility to America per se, or is a motivating force for widespread Muslim activism or protest. In other words, there is very little traction in the street. Politics in Indonesia remains primarily animated by local and national concerns, and very rarely in recent years has been directed at the United States. This does not at all mean that we shouldn't be concerned about small, particularly violent radical groups and individuals; but in this case they do not represent a nationwide trend or momentum, in my view, in Indonesia.

Returning to the free press, in fact there was a combination of an extremely free press with vibrant Islamic politics in a democratizing Indonesia which changed the equation entirely. I think a lot of Americans and foreigners who have spent a lot of time in Indonesia weren't really used to this and it was misinterpreted by some outsiders. The press' representation of the masses was misrepresented. There were never more than a few thousand people who protested in the street. And I think we can quickly see, in October and November, evidence of the shallowness of this anti-American feeling. The Afghanistan campaign was suddenly replaced in the press by the Akbar Tanjung, Golkar scandal that has been the main media issue since. Then there was also the apprehension of Tommy Soeharto which took

over the front pages and pushed Afghanistan and anti-Americanism definitely off the front pages and out of the papers entirely after mid November.

Eventually you had the expression of natural interests prevailing over other interests. This is a growing refrain, most articulately announced by Syafii Ma'arif, head of Muhammadiyah, but also by Hashim Muzadi of Nahdlatul Ulama. Beginning in mid-November their interests had to do with reform of governance or with getting the economy going. And the basic argument became 'Why are you all worried about these things in Afghanistan when they really don't concern the daily lives of ordinary Indonesians?'

But how do we account for what was extremely appropriate American concern with those people who threatened to "sweep" or expel Americans from Indonesia, and then were not punished? There was a lot of concern that the laws against these things were not applied in this case.

I think the single most important intractable problem in Indonesia is impunity and that the court system does not work. They basically don't work for anybody, whether you're threatening Americans or whether you're waging a holy war inside Indonesia; whether you're a corporate criminal or guilty of gross human rights violations in East Timor. The judiciary doesn't work for anyone, so I don't think there is special protection offered to those threatening Americans. When you combine this long-standing institutionalized impunity with the domestic political risks that Megawati associated (and perhaps exaggerated) with any potential crackdown on political expressions of Islam, which of course would remind Indonesians of the battle days of Soeharto when legitimate Islamic expressions of politics were demonized, we can begin to get a picture of the constraints which were operating in the post-September 11 period.

Having said all that, it's also important to note a couple of things that were not visible at all. The government, albeit in a very tardy fashion, nonetheless eventually deployed significant police resources to protect Americans and American institutions in Indonesia. USAID contract workers working in Central Java, American companies including foundations, our own foundation, suddenly had police protection that appeared out of nowhere. The order had come from the top and there was no public acknowledgement of this. The government didn't brag about this, in fact didn't say anything about this, which might have been also their mistake,

but by mid-October we were feeling we had a better security.

Is there a silver lining in any of this? I think what shocked a lot of the mainstream Muslim organizations was the rapidity with which extremists came to dominate the press after September 11, including, but not limited to those expressions of anti-Americanism. This eventually galvanized mainstream Muslims to set into motion some extraordinary efforts to reclaim debate over Islam and Indonesia and to restate Islam as a force for pragmatic nationalism. This is in the message of Hashim Muzadi of Nahdlatul Ulama and this has been the message of Syafii Ma'arif as well since mid-November and gaining momentum since last month. This represents a change in the discourse. Even some of the more militant groups are now saying, 'We do believe in equal rights for women and we're also in favor of interfaith dialogue and democracy.' I think this indicates a more balanced dialogue which we didn't see in September and October, but is coming back into the foreground.

Lunch Session Discussion

Q: Are Indonesian objections to U.S. foreign policy or Middle East policy? I recall one of Gus Dur's first policy statements having to do with Israel and the negative reaction to this in Indonesia.

Ramage: The issue is very much the Middle Eastern aspect of U.S. foreign policy that's been contentious in Indonesia. For decades Indonesia has had a very consistent position on the Middle East and on the Palestinians' right to self-determination. That is what people are particularly focused on post-September 11. But it was there before September 11. We saw a bit of it during the Gulf War but it was not as noticeable because of the controls on the press and the different nature of the Gulf War as opposed to the campaign in Afghanistan.

You have referred to Gus Dur's attempt when he became president to begin the process of extending some kind of diplomatic recognition to Israel. This has actually been a principal point of Gus Dur. For at least 15 years he has argued that Indonesia should treat Israel as a normal country and should recognize it. It was one of the first initiatives he pushed as president and he was attacked quite strongly from Muslim groups and Islamic politicians. Many people thought it was unnecessary, in terms of how weak his presidency was, to spend valuable political capital on that particular issue. It represented what Gus Dur had

been talking about for many, many years but it hurt him badly politically and domestically.

Ann Willner: There is a difference today in the attitude of Indonesia towards Israel in terms of expression of policy and behavior. When I was in Indonesia in the 1950s and 1960s some elements of the Masyumi party were interested in developing cooperatives and they were quite interested in the successful cooperatives system in Israel. I knew a couple of the leaders of the Nahdlatul Ulama and they were also interested in knowing more about Israel. I don't think the attitude was uniformly hostile. Certainly for some of the Islamic leaders and scholars it required a public attitude somewhat different from their private attitudes.

Ramage: I agree with you.

Ron Palmer, The George Washington University: I have been trying to gauge just how much change there has been in Islamic politics since September 11 and how one ought to think about it.

Ramage: Ultimately September 11 did not have a lot to do with domestic political politics. President Megawati still has a Teflon-like quality and she has managed to deflect some of these attacks on her. In some cases potential or real opposition parties to her are hopelessly divided. I think that it's kind of getting back to politics as normal. Post September 11 was something of an aberration domestically, though it quite severely strained U.S.-Indonesian relations.

Paul Cleveland, USINDO: I would like you to extend your comments about anti-American feeling, that is attitudes towards the United States, in the light of the search for the al Qaeda. There is a considerable amount of feeling among the Indonesian elite that perhaps we are being a little bit too obsessive or assiduous about that. Can you comment?

Ramage: I do not know what lasting impact this is going to have. Indonesians clearly perceive that the United States now has a checklist and that we're paying very close attention to particular issues. The danger is that Indonesians might continue to respond that it's business as usual, and that they will address these issues on their own terms, their own time and in their own way. The foreign minister said something to that effect. He is very eloquent and effective, and articulates Indonesia's foreign policy positions well. But I do not think that is accepted as readily by the United States and I worry that Indonesia – unlike Malaysia, which is not nearly as free and open a society as Indonesia – has not adjusted itself to new

global realities and there is a sense of missing some of the important benchmarks that the United States is looking for. Whether or not these are fair benchmarks I'm not sure but nonetheless they are being set down.

Barbara Harvey, retired Foreign Service: In early December there was not much reporting and even now it is still under-reported in the Indonesia press about the reaction of the Afghanistan people who were liberated from Taliban rule. I remember asking an old friend who was a senior editor about this and he said "We are all afraid of being portrayed as anti-Islamic." Now, has that atmosphere changed, or is there still a feeling among some of the more moderate or mainstream press that they might be attacked for being anti-Islamic?

Ramage: Actually, since December I am struck by how quickly many people have changed their tune on the Taliban. There began to appear in late November, early December, a couple of references in the Indonesian press that Indonesia in fact had never recognized the Taliban government. Indonesian citizens were not aware of this at all. In fact there were also stories that the government of Rabani had maintained an embassy in Jakarta staffed by a chargé d'affaires to the present time. There was a letter in *Suara Pembaruan* which said basically "So you mean that the government which has just been defeated by the Americans is the government we never liked anyway?"

It is hard to overestimate the impact on Indonesians of the treatment of women in particular. This had a very sobering effect on the discussion of Afghanistan and very quickly a notion that this was a government upholding Islam was not backed. Looking back it is remarkable how often the Indonesian press, television, newspapers and magazines reprinted the photographs of the lines of people having beards shaved and pictures of women taking off their head covers. The press loved those images. They loved the anti-American images in September and October and they loved those images also and those pictures got played up as prominently as they did in *Time* magazine or *Newsweek*.

Audie Onibala, Poso Watch Network: You mentioned earlier the vibrant press in Indonesia. However I just spoke with a leading journalist from Indonesia who mentioned that no one dared to criticize the radical movement if he wanted to stay in business. In the old days if you criticized Soeharto they would take away your license. But now if you criticize the radical movement they will take your

life. The only press that is willing to speak up in Indonesia now is the one from Manado which is mostly a Christian area.

Ramage: I think you have just touched on something that illustrates the changing dynamics of the press in Indonesia since 1998. The greatest threat to press freedom in Indonesia today does not emanate from the state or from the security forces. It does not come in the form of a telephone call in the middle of the night. It comes from within and amongst the community itself. It tends to fall on the issue of reporting on extremists or violent expressions of Islam or violence masquerading under the banner of Islam. Reporting on that has at times been responded to by people like the Front Pembela Islam [Indonesian Defense Front], marching to a newspaper demanding that it make a retraction, or attacking a radio station, in one case in Solo about a year and a half ago. There is concern about this and you are absolutely right. But it doesn't cancel out the fact that you do have this enormously vibrant press. There are weak points and that's absolutely one of them, and compared to pre-1998 there is absolutely no comparison whatsoever in terms of what the press covers: the investigations into corruption, investigations into problems in governance; and the detailed accounts of human rights violations by senior military officers. But there is a reluctance to report on some of the issues related to the activities of Laskar Jihad.

Robert Pringle, retired Foreign Service: Do we have what is normally referred to as a public diplomacy problem in Indonesia? Or, given the parameters of U.S. policy which are not going to change much, do we just have to ride this one out as opposed to trying to handle it better somehow?

Ramage: I believe that these issues are not easily addressed. The U.S. Embassy has worked extremely hard trying to release press statements and trying to release alternative information out in the press. The U.S. Embassy website in Jakarta is very good. The problem is that Indonesia has one of the lowest internet connectivity rates in the world so not a lot of people are reading the terrific material that the embassy is putting on the website. But in large measure there is no short term response. There is a long term dimension which President Bush and others have begun to address more globally.

James Smith, Republican Conference, office of Congressman J.C. Watts: Could you tell us more about some of the challenges that we face in Indonesia in the war on terrorism in terms of cracking

down on any al Qaeda elements that may or may not be there, or cracking down on financial networks that traffic through Indonesia. How is Indonesia doing on implementing UN Security Council resolutions since September 11?

Ramage: What I feel most keenly is the complete absence of reliable information. This is not a dodge to your question but I have to say I don't know. I have not seen any compelling evidence yet, and I don't think a lot of Indonesians have either, which points definitively to concrete linkages to al Qaeda. But there's a lot of circumstantial evidence that there are individuals involved. The *Washington Post* has done some good reporting. I certainly don't have access to information which allows me to respond well to your question. So I would rather not characterize how Indonesia is making progress in terms of UN Resolutions and so on.

Mark Woodward: I want to amplify something that Doug said, namely that this virulent anti-American rhetoric is nothing new. Papers like *Media Dakwa* have been writing about CIA, Mossad, and Chinese conspiracies to destroy Islam for years. There may have been a temporary upsurge in this. But it is fundamentally nothing new and it's wise to hear what Gus Dur had to say about these people. I once asked him, "These people are so crazy, why don't you just ban them?" He replied, "Nobody listens to them seriously anyway and if we let them talk, we know where they are."

Donald Weatherbee, the University of South Carolina: This morning the last comment Professor Hefner made in his prepared remarks was that they ought to arrest some of the more radical, violence-prone Islamicists. The question is why haven't they made arrests? Mark's comment may be partially correct, but I don't think that's fully explanatory as to why they haven't. Is it simply incompetence on the part of the authorities, i.e. the crisis of governance? Is it some latent sympathies in some of the attitudes articulated by the radicals? Or is it simply fear of domestic consequences which have already been threatened if actions should be taken? What is causing the immobility of the government at this time?

Ramage: Why aren't people arrested, and in particular those violent elements? I think it is part of each of the issues you mentioned. We shouldn't underestimate incompetence, we shouldn't underestimate weak institutions. Back in October I would have liked to see them arresting people who were threatening the lives of Americans. But what

kept bringing me back is that no one gets arrested in Indonesia. If one gets arrested they get released, or they get questioned, but they are not getting convicted for anything. It points to the extraordinary governance challenge.

With a few exceptions, I do not think people who are Islamic that might be implicated or guilty of committing crimes in the name of Islam are necessarily being extended special protection by the state. I think that they too are caught up in the overall culture of impunity in Indonesia. It comes back to Megawati and her lack of leadership in terms of rule of law. She is trying to balance this very weak coalition she has and she is very sensitive to spending some of her political capital on these issues in a way which might get her accused of being anti-Islam, or not a good Muslim herself.

SESSION III - Indonesian Reactions to the September 11 Terrorist Attacks, Extremism and U.S.-Indonesia Relations

Moeslim Abdurrahman: I think Douglas covered well the complexities of the relationship between Indonesian Muslims and the United States. I will share some of my personal observations of how Indonesian Muslims reacted to September 11. Among many Muslims in Indonesia for a long time there has been the widely held belief that there was an international conspiracy among the Christian Americans and Jews from Israel and the Chinese, trying to stir up trouble among the Muslim countries including Indonesia.

One week after September 11, I had my Friday prayers at a small mosque in the South Jakarta suburbs. I listened to the Islamic preacher, and he reminded the audience to be more careful about the international conspiracy. According to the preacher right now it is evident that the United States has conspired with the Jews and the international Christians to suppress Muslim countries like Indonesia. This helped to explain why the economic crisis is getting worse. It becomes easier for Christian missionaries to give rice to the poor people, and they will in turn be comforted by Christianity.

This is the popular sort of Islamic rhetoric during Friday prayers and Muslims listen carefully. Many still view the United States as a very dangerous enemy because U.S. foreign policy is biased in its treatment of Palestinian affairs. This kind of popular Islamic logic has become more and more popular after September 11.

I will give you another example of why the reaction seems ambiguous. One week after September 11 there were radical Islamic groups in Indonesia attempting to harass Westerners and threatening to conduct sweepings of foreigners and especially Americans in hotels and other establishments. These sweepings seemed very threatening. Even the McDonald's on Jalan Thamrin witnessed this threat of sweeping. The owner of McDonald's responded by making the establishment more Taliban friendly by hanging an Osama poster inside to make consumers feel secure.

And also, at that time, something incredible was the production of Osama T-shirts. The phenomena where you see young Indonesians wearing Osama Bin Laden T-shirts does not indicate their ideological support for Osama or the ideology of Talibanism. In my opinion it has more to do with the fact that after the fall of Soeharto the young generation was left without a role model. I still remember when we had an Islamic Iranian revolution and among University students they were waving banners with the image of the Ayatollah Khomeini without any intention to support the Islamic revolution, but to show that they were more militant and ideological Islamists than others. These are two examples reflecting the emotion that the young generation shares after September 11.

Another example that I will give you is an illustration of what I call the untreatable media in Indonesia. It is true that one week after September 11 everybody complained that Muslim scholars educated in the United States like Nurcholish Madjid, Azyumardi Azra, Syafii Ma'arif, and perhaps myself, did not say anything about the tragedy. The media covered the Front Pembela Islam sitting in the front of the U.S. Embassy condemning the Americans. I met with some of the Muslim student activists and I asked, "Why don't you join with the Front Pembela Islam?" They told me they complain about the double standard of U.S. foreign policy but they cannot join the Laskar Jihad because they refuse to wear the turban, an Arab symbol that is typical among Muslim radical groups. So for me there is still a distinction between the student opinions and their support of groups like Front Pembela Islam because there is a social class distinction between university students and the social origin of the Muslim group of radicals who protest against the United States by sitting in front of the U.S. Embassy.

We need to remember there are a variety of reactions to September 11 in Indonesia and there are nuances

of Islamic aspiration. I think it is difficult to make generalizations about Islam in Indonesia. There is also an uncritical media that often fails to cover both sides of the story between radical Islam and moderate Islam.

Recently we organized a small conference in Jakarta and invited Syafii Ma'arif and some of the Islamic leaders like Ulil Abshar Abdalla from the young generation. Pak Syafii made a good statement at this conference. He warned Muslims in Indonesia not to idolize the Taliban in Indonesia because if they knew the meaning and practice of Talibanism in Afghanistan they would see that it is so different and dangerous not only for the non-Muslim community but within the Muslim community itself. But the media failed to cover the statement by Pak Syafii in this conference.

This is a good example of why sometimes we still have uneven media coverage of both sides between the radical aspirations and also Islamic moderates. Lastly, I will give you the last of my personal experiences, I am working with the Muhammadiyah and within the Muhammadiyah we have the Muhammadiyah Teenager Association, what we call *Ikatan Remaja Muhammadiyah*. Many in this grouping were confused about the United States. They asked me whether they should boycott American products. They decided to boycott Coca-Cola. I told them it is also a double standard if they boycott Coca-Cola because Coca-Cola is not really an American product. Coca-Cola is produced in Indonesia with Indonesian capital and by Indonesian workers. I told them to think more seriously about American funding. If they choose to boycott Coca-Cola why don't they also refuse American aid. Ultimately they decided to boycott Coca-Cola but not on religious grounds. They joined with NGOs protesting global economic capitalism.

If you try to understand and interpret what Indonesian Islam is you have to get more specific. When everything is generalized it is very dangerous. It is a gross generalization to say that Indonesian Islam right now has a connection with al Qaeda. The majority of people are still trying to figure out the meaning of Islam; the meaning of gender according to Islam; the meaning of democracy according to Islam. The whole history of Islam, like other religions, is part of human interpretation. So Muslims in Indonesia, even NU and Muhammadiyah, are trying to interpret Islam in the new challenges in the world today.

This morning we heard about the unique aspects of Islam in Indonesia, particularly the social, educational, and cultural functions of Islam which are quite different from the Middle East. The Muhammadiyah and the NU have many universities, hospitals, and social projects outside of the state. Muslim civil society in Indonesia is very strong. People in the United States need to understand the problem in Indonesia is how to help the Muslim community strengthen civil society right now, to revive the notion that Islamic solidarity is part of what we call the core of the civil society. We demonstrated this recently when the government responded miserably during disastrous flooding in parts of the country. The government bureaucracy did not provide any assistance to the people.

So for me, it is better if we have bridges to more understanding between society and society. How to re-educate the Muslim community in Indonesian and American society so that in the future we have trust to work together to establish what we call the new civilized global community. Otherwise we are destined to the continued clashing of civilizations.

Rizal Sukma: Doug Ramage basically described the Indonesian responses to September 11 very accurately. But there are a few other issues I would like to add. As an Indonesian I have multiple identities. I was puzzled at how Indonesians reacted immediately after September 11. Yet in some ways the reactions were understandable. If we look at comments made by academics and scholars and the so called hard-liners, one of the arguments put forward was that the U.S. is arrogant. I was puzzled by this kind of comment pointing blame on the victims. This attitude was prevalent shortly after the terrorist attacks.

As an Acehnese I fully understand this reaction of blaming the victims because that happened to me. When the police burned the village where my grandmother lived in Aceh, my family complained about it and the police said, "We didn't burn your grandmother's house. We burned only one house but the wind was strong and burned your grandmother's house."

As an Acehnese I was also angry when the U.S. initiated the military campaign in Afghanistan. Many people became angry and objected to the collateral damage. Yet, no one raised the issue regarding Aceh. In one conference when I raised the question how many Afghan civilians died in the military campaign almost everybody came up with the exact numbers. But when I asked how many Acehnese died in 2001,

not one knew the number and I'm sure even today not many people in Indonesia know for sure how many Acehnese died in the violence during January 2002 alone. But they are quick to react when Palestinians get shot in the West Bank. For the record 238 Acehnese died during the month of January this year.

Back to reactions to September 11. Especially in Jakarta reactions were directed to test the fragility of Megawati's government at the time. You can see how the attitude of the government shifted from being nervous and uneasy to ambiguity. That also reflects the very difficult position in which Megawati found herself. She was walking a tightrope trying to find balance between supporting the war on terrorism, but at the same time not to be seen as acting under American pressure. I think that is very typical of any post-colonial state in Asia and also in Africa and, to a lesser degree, in Latin America.

When the U.S. started the military campaign there was some kind of anonymous criticism of the use of military force in dealing with global issues like the threat of international terrorism. Many people questioned the efficacy of the use of military force in dealing with terrorism. Many also argued that since international terrorism is a global problem then a global force is needed through a global institution like the United Nations. Soon after the Taliban was removed this view dissipated.

I have been asked to address the forms and expressions of militancy and radicalism in Indonesia. Radicalism is caused by four factors. The first cause is moral frustration. The government and/or the security apparatus is basically incapable of dealing with illegal activities like gambling. This leads to moral frustration and people justify taking matters into their own hands. Another factor is ideological obsession that can lead to a war of ideas. Ulil Abshar Abdalla addressed this issue where basically there is a fear of globalization and also a fear of Western domination. There are some in Indonesia who are seeking to establish some kind of Pan Islam movement. Many also see that as an expression of nostalgia, of idealizing the glorious past. The third form of radicalism is basically political extortion. I think Bob Hefner already addressed the issue where political extortion is involved in this kind of activity or movement. The fourth is also a form of economic and social resentment rooted in the socioeconomic disparities made worse by the economic crisis that hit the country in 1997.

It is also quite clear to me that radicalism is primarily based in Java and is urban based. It's only in Jakarta, Yogyakarta and Solo. There is not much to be found outside Java.

If you are familiar with Jack Schneider's study *From Fortune to Violence* it is clear that militant politics resulted from the sudden collapse of the authoritarian regime of Soeharto and the newfound openness that followed. Those who engage in militant or radical politics are generations who grew up in the late 1970s and 1980s. That was the period where the New Order was at the height of its power and exercised tight political control over any form of expression of political Islam. When the country moved toward democracy I suspect that some of these people basically did not realize that we had already moved toward democracy and they became obsessed with expressing their political interests.

There was some kind of need to taste power suddenly dispersed all over the country with the collapse of the authoritarian regime. It also emerged because of the political game. There was great political struggle among the elite and among the military generals in the country.

Another cause of radicalism and militancy is the very weak, almost non-existent, law enforcement. I do not need to go into detail here.

Finally, the continuing economic hardship since the economic crisis in 1997 has left around 14 million people unemployed. There are 1.3 million internally displaced persons still living in refugee camps. Not only the Christians in the Moluccas; at least 400,000 Madurese who fled Kalimantan are still stuck on the small island of Buton.

How is militant politics expressed? It was and still is expressed in three forms. First, it is expressed against fellow Muslims. And this signifies that this militancy is basically an intra-religious problem. Second, it is expressed against the symbols of globalization: prosperity and what some militants see as moral decadence. This is why there are raids on bars, entertainment centers and so on. Finally, it is expressed against the U.S. If you look carefully at all those issues being raised on the street, the issues are mainly against the U.S. They basically complain about the U.S. military campaign in Afghanistan, and the possible U.S. military campaign in Iraq. But no one questions Russian campaigns in Chechnya; no one questions the Chinese campaign in Xinjiang; no one questions the Burmese campaign against Rohingya Muslims in Burma; no one even complains

about the military atrocities in Aceh, or in any other part of Indonesia. It may have something to do with what Ambassador Skip Boyce calls the "David and Goliath" mentality in this context.

I want to comment on domestic impacts and how the use of anti-terrorist rhetoric may have significant consequences for Indonesia. I think we should be very careful here because this issue can be used by national governments, including the Indonesian government, to derail the process of democracy and the attempt to uphold human rights. The signs that this is happening are already there. Indonesia's new anti-terror bill might derail the democratization process.

The anti-terrorist rhetoric is being used for domestic political purposes as well. With regard to Aceh there is a tendency to portray Acehese as a bunch of al Qaeda sympathizers trying to bring suffering upon Indonesia. It has also been used to justify crackdowns on pro-democracy forces in Jakarta.

The United States should look very carefully at the role of the military and the issue of military reform. I have the impression that it seems the military or the police are playing this game saying "We are weak as a result of military sanctions the United States imposed on us and that's why we cannot deal with the terrorism issue. If you want us to deal with those terrorists, resume the IMET, resume the foreign assistance, resume the selling of these lethal weapons." That kind of possibility is not inconceivable because in some other countries that resumption of support of foreign militaries has occurred. In fact, there has been a lot of talk about how U.S.-Indonesia military-military relations might be improved in the post-September 11 period.

How do we deal with these issues? What can the United States do? Earlier I mentioned there were four forms of militant politics. The first three actually reflect issues that are basically intra-religious. In that context I do believe that should be worked out amongst Muslims themselves. The Muhammadiyah and Nahdlatul Ulama have already made attempts.

On militancy as a form of economic resentment, there I think the United States can and must play a role to help. However, it is ultimately the government of Indonesia that is solely responsible for whether Indonesia can move toward economic recovery. The IMF has provided a very detailed plan of action that we should follow and yet economic reforms have stalled. Perhaps the IMF now regrets ever getting

involved in Indonesia because the Indonesians are very bad students.

We should be careful not to allow the war on terrorism to take us off the transition path toward democracy. If we circumvent the Leahy Amendment and the United States begins selling lethal weapons to the military, can we be sure that those weapons will be used in order to combat terrorism? Will the weapons be used to suppress pro-democracy forces? Will the weapons be used to suppress the Papuan independence movement? Will the weapons be used to kill as many Acehnese as possible?

If the United States wants to pressure the government of Indonesia to do more in this area, do it through back-door diplomacy, because megaphone diplomacy will only make matters worse. There are problems with American public diplomacy. Since the fall of Soeharto the focus of many American institutions has been how to help Indonesia to democratize. Little attention has been paid to initiatives aimed at providing information to Indonesians about what is going on in the United States. What is the rationale for particular policies? I think there is a need to revitalize the role of the United States Information Service in Indonesia.

Finally, I think Americans need to understand that at the moment Indonesia is still unsettled with the past, confused with the present, and uncertain about its future. That is a very lethal combination for a very fragile democracy.

Donald K. Emmerson: I'd like to talk about the multiple usefulness of five things: introspection, leverage, activism, personality and impatience. And I would like to end with a few specifics.

My hotel is two blocks away on sixteenth street. This morning when I walked down I passed six large American flags. That's unremarkable in the aftermath of what happened on September 11. And yet in another respect it is very remarkable indeed. Let me say something at the risk of being massively misunderstood. I do not think there's quite as much difference between Islamism and Americanism as many Americans might think. Both of them have universal pretensions. Now you could argue that Islamism is focused on the *shariah*, on Islamic law, and there's no counterpart on the side of Americanism. Tell that to Johnny Lumintang who discovered when he visited the United States that he was on the receiving end of a legal document which I think is going to be a disincentive for him to return to the United States. Indeed arguably there are interest

groups that are dedicated to extending, shall we say, versions of American law worldwide. It's hard for me to find the equivalent of the resurrection of the caliphate, but in a universal, democratized polity, it's perhaps not completely off the mark to suggest that the United States would play a kind of lynchpin or keystone role. And again lest you think that I'm veering too far away from actual policy, remember the pride with which Madeleine Albright presided over the birth of the community of democracies. Think of the number of efforts underway funded by the United States, by American taxpayers, to establish some kind of global, democratic governance. And I cannot resist in this context, to mention a request for appropriations from Congress submitted by an unnamed agency.

Quote: "The challenge of democratization in the Moslem world is rooted in the worldwide interests and moral concerns of the United States." That's a remarkable statement. Here we have the melding of *realpolitik* and *moralpolitik*. We have the remarkable assertion that the interests of humanity are identical with the national interest of the United States. That is a presumptuous remark. Next quote, "The cancer of breakdown in any country can metastasize to other parts of the global body politic and thus constitutes a danger to international peace and security." What an extraordinarily wide open door for American intervention. Amazing. Here's another one, "People everywhere..." That's all of us, that's the entire human race, right? "People everywhere, regardless of their religion or culture, can achieve self government under the rule of law." Is this a kind of hyper-Wilsonian invitation to secession? Next quote, "The universal aspiration for democracy is the banner under which this battle for the defense of our national interest can be most effectively waged, and it is also the banner under which we have always proudly marched." There is a sense in which too many truths are being held as too self-evident, if I may paraphrase. The motto "Let's Roll!" which had extraordinarily heroic meaning inside the fuselage of United Airlines flight 93 has been replayed so many times and in so many policy contexts that it's almost as if we don't have to think anymore. All we have to do is *roll*.

I'm wondering in this context how the conclusions reached by Greg Fealy earlier today shape up against the democratizing agenda of the United States. You will recall that he said the five Islamic parties he was dealing with were organizationally fragmented, ineptly led, and ideologically vague. Now being a political scientist, from a standpoint of civic education and the formation of superior political

parties, which presumably would be an essential ingredient to a successful democracy, which would of course then reflect the national interest of the United States in the universal aspiration of all human beings, one could argue that in the conclusions reached by Prof. Fealy is a magnificent agenda for an American activist foreign policy. That is to make sure that Islamic parties unite, are ably led, and fill the vacuum of the Jakarta Charter. I wondered when I was listening to Greg, what his Indonesian colleagues on that panel might think and whether precisely the disunity and poor leadership and lack of specification of what the Islamic state might actually mean that characterizes these parties might not be considered a positive thing. If one were to organize the inert Islamic political mass into an effective force, could one live to regret the outcome of a policy that is so morally committed to democracy as an end in itself? Would that policy be insensitive to the collateral damage one can do by pursuing quite so vigorously such a red, white and blue agenda?

When you add to that the “Axis of Evil” I think the distinction between the moral and the empirical begins to fade away and then the possibility of analysis itself is cast in this serious question.

If I haven’t alienated anyone yet, let me keep going. I would like to talk about the utility of leverage and I would like to ask a question, the answer to which is not really clear to me. I just think it’s an important question. Is Indonesia better off when the United States badly wants something from it? Something for it to do, or something for it to stop doing? Or is Indonesia better off when the United States has no such priority, no such pressure? Think of a spectrum between American indifference and American obsession. Is there perhaps a point, in which a relationship that is so fundamentally and so structurally asymmetric, which of course works against Indonesia, Indonesia can find some minimal leverage in American concern? In the interest that the United States has for Indonesia to do something or to stop doing something is it not conceivable therefore, that since September 11 there is an increasingly relentless American focus on what Indonesia “needs to do?” Perhaps this opens up a situation in which Indonesia acquires some modest leverage in which it becomes possible to say, “Well, if you want us to do this so badly, arrest Basyir and so on, then what are you going to be doing for us?” After all they saw the edifying spectacle of Mrs. Arroyo coming to Washington and going away with quite a bit, quite a bit more actually than Megawati went away with. Now they may look at what’s happening in Basilan and the Sulawar archipelago

and say, “Oh my God, that should never happen here in our archipelago.”

Nevertheless, I want to approach this issue of leverage from a somewhat more creative point of view. The asymmetric character of the relationship is critical to my argument. Let’s remember what the Indonesians did to the Dutch in the old IGGI. It was easy for Soeharto to do that because the relationship really wasn’t all that asymmetric. Let’s think of the difficulties that Prime Minister Howard is facing in Indonesia, I believe today, with regard to the refusal of Amien Rais to meet him and so forth. Now Australia is a next-door neighbor, and in that sense more proximate, at least, and I suppose more important perhaps even than Holland, but it’s no United States. One can afford to have poor relations with Australia in a way that becomes a little more problematic, unless you are a full-blown Sukarno, with the United States. I do want to emphasize the structural condition within which leverage has these multiple uses.

With regard to activism, again forgive these comparisons. Since communism is dead and has been consigned to the ashcan of history, all the more reason to resurrect its terminology. If Karl Marx asked the question, ‘What is going on?’ Then Lenin of course asked the question, ‘What is to be done?’ There is a sense in the emphasis in activism on results in present day American policy, a very Leninist character. Not just what is being done, but what have you, Indonesia, done? Not just the day before yesterday, but actually yesterday as well?

I think we all know that – and there are people in the room who may wish to disabuse me of this since I have no security clearance and I’m therefore limited to the media – but I think it is factually the case that there was at some point a matrix, on paper, in which you have the names of particular countries marching down the page to the left and in which you had columns as to what these countries have done with regard to specific issues in the global war on terror. That is not surprising incidentally in light of what happened on September 11: it is entirely understandable. I’m still looking at the consequences of this incredibly activist focus on the need to wrap up this network, to make arrests, to search for and capture, or kill the individuals responsible for what happened on September 11 and who might be responsible.

Let’s remember this is also a matter of prevention. People who were living in Jakarta in the last couple of years had an experience with vulnerability that

was perhaps greater than I experienced out in California watching what happened in New York on television. So these are real emotions we are dealing with. The issue of prevention is crucial. By one account of 22 top al Qaeda leaders, 16 remain unaccounted for. My colleagues at Stanford, when we met in October, assured me (these are experts on chemical, biological, nuclear war, very technical people, engineers, people with science degrees) there was 100 percent certainty that within a matter of weeks there would be another major terrorist attack following the September 11 event. Now you know, if certain shoes had exploded one can imagine the averted events. So far, knock on wood, nothing major has occurred, but notice how that also animates American policy, because who is going to say next week, that yet another disaster occurred, and could've been prevented by the United States if it had an even more activist foreign policy that it presently pursues in terms of making sure that all those countries had done enough yesterday and would do even more today and the day after to track down these individuals.

This leads to the remarkable fourth point I want to make with regard to personality. I want you to imagine a spectrum with at one extreme, individuals who need to be captured, punished, or in the famous purposely ambiguous phrase, "either brought to justice or had justice brought to them," (implying the kind of use of violence in the war metaphor here) to the extreme opposite, in which one looks cosmically at the nature of Islamic society and asks the Bernard Lewis question: "What went wrong?" to quote the title of his latest overview of centuries of Islamic history. One looks at the sociology, one looks at tectonic shifts in the relations and sizes of different classes and so forth. It's a little bit comparable to what one does when you walk into a bad neighborhood here in the United States and either you are immediately driven to the worry that these kids may have been brought up poorly and that leads you to educational reform or whether you are primarily concerned to arrest the bastards who were creating the crime and causing the instability.

I think this shows up nicely in successive issues of *Newsweek* magazine which reflect this fluctuation along this spectrum. On the fourth of February, that is last week, we have Malaysia described as a good place to lie low. Notice the implication that terrorism is a matter of terrorists who are looking for a place to lie low and incidentally, what better place than Indonesia which has the virtues among other things, of being a lot larger than Somalia. Which is another

reason for concern, American activist security-based concern with regard to Indonesia.

Here's the current issue of *Newsweek*: "The Bible and the Koran, Searching the Holy Books for Roots of Conflicts and Seeds of Reconciliation."

Where's the appropriate point to settle down for policy purposes in this spectrum? Obviously it is easier to focus on the evil one, or the evil ones, on individuals and to focus on punishment and prevention as the appropriate response. A pretty dramatic example of this, highly relevant to Indonesia, is the current issue of the *Asian Wall Street Journal* in which the title is: "Indonesian Cleric Becomes the Focus of Terror Manhunt." And here's the first sentence: "Asian police and intelligence officials say they have put a face on the global threat posed by Southeast Asia's Islamic militants, a bearded, Indonesian cleric named Ridwan Isamudin," the famous, and still apparently missing, Hambali. And here we have a chart showing the web of terror. This is Southeast Asia's web of terror, I'm quoting the *Wall Street Journal*, and in the center of the chart is yes, Hambali. And Indonesia is also well-represented in the periphery, in fact immediately beneath Hambali we have Fathur Rahman al-Ghozi, who studied at Al Mukmin, which is of course the school run by Abu Bakar Ba'asyir, pictured right next door to al-Ghozi. This kind of analysis drives you to individuals, personalities and essentially a law and order response in which American impatience, which is my next topic, is increasingly easy to understand.

Impatience with Indonesia: why can't you be more like the Singaporeans? If there could be terrorists planning attacks on American installations and personnel in a ship as tightly organized and run as Singapore, imagine what can be going on in Indonesia. Again, another driving source of alarm.

I want to skip ahead for fear of exhausting the time. Military to military relations, the famous and not yet disappearing issue of mil-mil relations is a good illustration of some of the ambiguities that I've been dealing with. The quite clearly posed question of security versus human rights. I have tried hard today and failed to obtain a definitive answer to the question: Has the Bush administration in its latest budget submission specifically requested military assistance to Indonesia? One source tells me absolutely not. The *Asian Financial Review* tells me the opposite. It does occur to me that if I were in the Bush administration there might be certain advantages to including in that draft, proposed legislation, a specific reference to military assistance to Indonesia. Because then, if Congress throws it

out, as they may well do, then at least I could say privately to the Indonesian government, "Well...I tried." On the other hand, that might be far too Machiavellian on my part since I simply lack information. I do, however, wish to say that September 11 quite clearly has created a situation in which authorization – blanket authorization, without specifying the name of the recipient country – global authorization for the campaign against terrorism has opened up an opportunity to make an end run around the Leahy Amendment. Maybe not a blatant end run in the sense of a U.S. government transfer of deadly equipment, you know, bombs and guns, perhaps not. But indirectly under the guise of training forces around the world to help us engage in this battle against terrorism, what might amount to something close to virtually the same thing. This is a fascinating realm, again with ambiguity. It is not coincidental in this context and I have to be fair about this. This is something I support and together with Bob Hefner during Congressional testimony emphasized the need to assist the Indonesian police. Again this is a way of trying to avoid the Scylla and Charybdis problem. That is to say the police is no longer the military. It is not KOPASSUS anyway, although the police in many respects is just as corrupt as the military. I would argue in Aceh perhaps has even more responsibility for some of the depredation that has occurred in that part of Indonesia. At least from an American point of view there is a bit of swaggering on what should be after all a civilian institution. It will be fascinating to watch this as it develops. There will be some effort to try and balance these two priorities rather than trying to elide them as in the opening rhetoric I mentioned in the beginning, as if human rights were the same thing as security and vice versa, which seems to me is quite naive.

A very brief comment with regard to Aceh. The Acehnese situation at the moment is extraordinarily interesting. I would argue that if you agree that the recent meeting in Geneva constitutes a modestly limited success in efforts to move towards a peaceful outcome in Aceh, then I think you should entertain the possibility that GAM, the Aceh Freedom Movement, came to the table in considerable part because of what happened on September 11. There are implications for the degrees of freedom within which they could maneuver vis-à-vis Jakarta in relation to the U.S. What I found intriguing is that General Zinni, whom we will recall from failed efforts to reconcile Palestine and Israel, was present at that two-day meeting that just ended in Geneva. I've been so negative in so many ways it would be helpful to end on a positive note, not that I'm exaggerating the importance of this encounter, but I

do want to suggest that not all of the outcomes from September 11 in terms of American policy towards Indonesia are necessarily negative.

Session III Discussion

Michael Billington, Executive Intelligence Review: What do you think the impact would be of an Israeli movement in Palestine which now seems very possible or a U.S. campaign in Iraq which is being pushed in the administration and elsewhere? How would that impact the internal situation in Indonesia and the region?

Sukma: If the United States initiates a military campaign in Iraq I think it will have a very profound impact on domestic politics in many Muslim countries, not only Indonesia. In terms of Indonesia I think we are going to see a replay of what happened in the weeks after September 11. In that context it would be very difficult also for Megawati's government to deal with such an attack on Iraq.

But in general we can also expect that the war on Iraq is basically necessary. And then governments and the Islamic organizations might be able to detach this issue from its religious contexts similar to what happened in 1990 during the Gulf War. There was also growing protest at the time of the war against Iraq, after the Iraqi invasion of Kuwait, that it was in fact war against Islam. Soeharto and a number of Muslim leaders at the time managed to detach the two aspects so the Gulf War was not basically conceived as a religious war. But that was easier because it involved Kuwait, another Muslim country. But the situation will be different and more difficult in the case of Iraq if indeed an attack is imminent.

Abdurrahman: I have read that if the United States is able to prove the al Qaeda connection then maybe we can understand the intentions of the Bush Administration. But if the United States invades Iraq I believe the opposition in Indonesia will try to find new issues to criticize Megawati. There are so many groups within radical Islam that would manipulate a United States invasion into Iraq for domestic political purposes.

Emmerson: An American attack on Iraq for American relations with Indonesia would be somewhere between disastrous and catastrophic. Having said that it seems to me what happens prior to that is critical. If the administration would like to incrementally ratchet up the pressure for Iraq to accept inspectors, it seems to me more people are likely to think of that as a legitimate issue, and there

can be a prolonged preparation to see just how intransigent Baghdad seems to be. This strikes me as far more plausible than a sudden attack on Iraq. This could have different consequences. But there is a mountain of distrust that would have to be overcome not just in Indonesia but widely in the Muslim world, where just as the story about 4,000 Jews that did not show up for work at the World Trade Center on September 11 continues to circulate, so do we get a fairly vigorous blaming of the United States for the deaths of children in Iraq.

Woodward: I want to amplify Don's point. This rumor is spread all over the Muslim world like many of the others we have talked about. The number is 500,000 Iraqi children murdered by the United States; that's the way it comes across in Arabic, Persian, Turkish and Indonesian and that's the kind of mountain that would have to be overcome.

Oscar Rambas, Manado, North Sulawesi: I heard about the push to incorporate the Jakarta Charter in the Constitution [to formally establish Islamic Law to apply to all Muslims - ed]. If that happens, I'm afraid Manado is going to declare independence and no longer want to be part of Indonesia.

Sukma: On the issue why no military officials are being punished for the violation of human rights I think the answer is quite simple. If you look at the current government it is basically a coalition government in which Megawati only commanded 33 percent of the vote. Since the fall of Soeharto Indonesia's political system has become highly competitive in which all civilian forces are competing against each other. There lies the greatest problem and threat to the democratic transition where in a very highly competitive system civilian forces do not want to antagonize the military because they need the support of the military in order to compete with other civilian forces. You can see this all across the globe where democratic transitions are taking place – it is not only in Indonesia. This is the real problem and the greatest threat to democracy in Indonesia.

No president will be able to address the question of military accountability, especially if the United States restores military-to-military relations. That will give even more credibility to the military to consolidate their power vis-à-vis the democratic forces in the country.

On the question of the Jakarta Charter I don't think there is anything to worry about. If you look at those who advocate this it is only a very small portion of the vote within the entire parliament. It is only PBB

[Crescent and Star Party] and PPP [National Development Party] and even the PPP made a deal with Megawati that they would withdraw support if their chairman [Hamzah Haz] was elected vice president at the time. So if anyone wants to revive the Jakarta Charter it has to go through the parliament and that is almost impossible in my view. In fact big Muslim organizations like NU and Muhammadiyah have already publicly opposed attempts to revive the Jakarta Charter.

Donald Weatherbee: What Pak Rizal just said echoes what has been said in other sessions that the real problem in Indonesia is a crisis of governance. How do we get better governance? All of the indicators are that as we march towards 2004 Indonesia may just go over the cliff. Are we really and implicitly talking about a failed state?

Emmerson: The failure of a state lies in the eyes of the observer. If we compare Indonesia to admittedly spectacular examples of state failures I would certainly think that Indonesia is not there yet. Nor do I think this is a Greek tragedy that has only one horrific outcome. Having said that, one of the difficulties is time. Long-term solutions require time for implementation and to take your question and put it slightly differently how much time is there for these long-term responses? Today if I'm not mistaken a delegation from USAID has focused an increasing portion of its money, time and energies on governance and is going to Indonesia for a month-long assessment of what needs to be done with regard to this particular issue. They are looking at ways the United States might assist the process of governance. If state failure does occur it will not occur for lack of American attention to the problem.

The problem is that the impatience of the United States for results is out of synch with the necessarily long term and structural character of the political reform that would be required. An example is the electoral issue which came up earlier. Should the United States nudge the Indonesians – through Indonesian graduates of American universities with degrees in political science – to move towards a district system? What is the relative benefit of allocating scarce resources to that sort of process of electoral or constitutional reform as opposed to perhaps different and more immediate efforts to address issues like corruption, the judiciary and so forth? Some of these issues unravel the more you look at them.

Barbara Harvey, retired Foreign Service: This is partly in response to Don Weatherbee's question

whether Indonesia is a failed state. I think many of us who have been involved with Indonesia over the years do despair from time to time. At the same time we need to recognize that a transition from a long established authoritarian government like the Soeharto regime to a more open democratic one is going to be difficult and at least Indonesia now has options that it didn't have before.

In contrast to the situation in the 1960s, the first time I was in Indonesia when I thought that Indonesia was a failed state, there has been an increase in the number of educated people; the number of people active in the NGOs; people questioning what is going on in Indonesia themselves. There is now a better opportunity to come through this really difficult time.

Marc Hoffman: There are a couple of things I've noticed and I cannot figure out the relationship among them. Many of us heard Amien Rais at a USINDO gathering talking about Zionism. He seemed to be saying that Zionism was behind some of the disturbances in Indonesia. He drew a distinction between Judaism which he was compelled to respect because of his religion and Zionism but I frankly did not understand the distinction he was making. Another thing I noticed after the September 11 tragedy was that Ambassador Gelbard objected to something published in the papers by Dewi Fortuna Anwar saying the World Trade Center was attacked because it was a symbol of Jewish power in America. There are stories about Muslim leaders telling their congregations that they should be careful because they are under threat from this conspiracy. What are the implications of these misperceptions for American policy? What is happening in Indonesia?

Woodward: I have looked into the anti-Semitic rhetoric that one hears in Indonesia. I don't know exactly how the stories move around. This has been going on for at least 30 years. There is a story that Neil Armstrong heard the call to pray on the moon and became a Muslim but he could never say so because he would have lost his government. This story is known in every village and town from Morocco to Eastern Indonesia. There are a whole lot of strange rumors that float around.

The anti-Semitic rhetoric is rooted in documentation of the origins and the protocol of the elders of Zionism. The Russian secret service published reports justifying pogroms against Jews and these have been translated into many languages. I was somewhat shocked to pick up a copy in an Indonesian bookstore with an introduction that said the Jewish bankers, the communists, the Chinese, and the CIA

are all involved in this conspiracy to destroy Islam all over the world. I might add that as strange as these stories seem to us, if you float around rural America and ask people about Muslims, the stereotype is a guy riding a camel with a bomb in a suitcase and a Kalishnikov assault rifle in the other hand. In terms of the public diplomacy question I think these are exactly some of the issues we need to combat and say "Hey people, these rumors are not true."

Closing Remarks

Paul Cleveland: I would like to conclude with a couple of thoughts that emanate from this conference. It doesn't seem to me that the problem is Islam or that we need to worry so much about Islam in Indonesia. It is moderate. As the first speaker pointed out, it is cliché to say that Islam is moderate or liberal in Indonesia. That remained the case throughout the discussions. The problem obviously today in Indonesia is governance, democracy, the rule of law, economic development, recovery, disposition of the military and last but hardly least the whole question of leadership. Will the Indonesian leadership step in and begin to make decisions and take issue with some of the worst things that are going on in the country.

One other general comment that seems to come out of this conference is the question of perception. If you are on the Indonesian side you can see the United States as unilateralist full of manifest destiny, Zionism, etc. If you are on the American side you can see the reciprocal of that. We need to be careful; we need to have conferences like this and I'm glad to say I think this conference has been exceptionally successful in clarifying many of the thoughts that have been worrying many of us.

I do think there are lessons in this. For the United States in particular I think we have to watch our own tendency to be a "city upon a hill" and be alert to some of the things Don Emmerson suggested we should not do. It seems to me that we need to balance our desire to create links with the Indonesian military with our desire to foster democracy in Indonesia. I don't want to make any final decision about that but how we go about that has been brought out here as a critical question.

We must continue to assist democratic institution building in Indonesia. We have a remarkable resource in our USAID mission, which is helping build democracy. The congressional group USINDO just took to Indonesia met with representatives of major U.S. companies in Indonesia and asked "What can we do when we go back and talk to our bosses?"

Every single businessman said “Number one: support the aid mission here in this country.” I have never in all of my thirty-seven years in the Foreign Service or since heard such a strong acclamation in favor of AID from the business community and I think that’s a striking commendation.

We need of course to build links, but not at the cost of democracy in Indonesia. That seems to me is our first and greatest priority. We should maintain that. And I have no less an authority here, to support me in that, than Paul Wolfowitz. A few days ago he made a statement about terrorism at a conference in Munich on European Security Policy. “From my own experience in Indonesia,” he said, “a country with the largest Muslim population of any in the world, I know that the vast majority of the world’s Muslims, have no use for the extreme doctrines espoused by such groups such as al Qaeda and the Taliban. To the contrary, they abhor terrorism and the way the terrorists have not only hijacked the airplanes, but also attempted to hijack one of the world’s great religions. Indonesia is another important example of a nation seeking to build a democratic government based on a culture of tolerance, but it does so in the face of severe economic obstacles. If we are serious about opposing terrorism, we should also be serious about helping that country with the largest population in the Muslim world, in its quest for a stable democracy.” Well said Paul Wolfowitz.

GLOSSARY

Abangan: syncretic Muslims in Java who combine Islamic with pre-Islamic beliefs

Ashram: Hindu study or meditation community

ayat: biblical/koranic verse

doa: supplication, prayer

Dewan Dakwah Islamiyah Indonesia: Islam Propagation Council

dhimmi, dhimmihood: a non-Muslim living under the protection of a Muslim state.

DI/TII: Darul Islam/Tentara Islam Indonesia, a separatist group in Aceh that rebelled against the government of Indonesia in the 1950s.

Fatayat: a woman's organization that is part of Muhammadiyah

fatwa: legal opinion concerning Islamic law

fiqh: understanding, comprehension, knowledge, and jurisprudence in Islam

Front Komunikasi Ahlu-Sunnah Wal-Jama'ah (FKASWJ): A radical Islamic group

Front Pembela Islam/Forum Pembela Islam (FPI): also known as Islamic Defenders' Front, a radical Islamic group

Forum Kajian Kitab Klasik Islam: Forum for the Study of Classical Islamic Texts

halaika: religious circles or study groups

hijab, jalabah, abayah: Islamic woman's head covering

Hizb al- Tahrir: a radical Islamic group

IAIN: Institute for Islamic Research Studies

ibu kyai: the wife or a daughter of a *kyai*

ICMI: Association of Indonesian Muslim Intellectuals

Ikatan Remaja Muhammadiyah: Muhammadiyah Teenager Association

Jakarta Charter: refers to wording proposed for the Indonesian Constitution in 1945 that would oblige all Muslims to observe Islamic law. The proposition was not included in the Constitution.

Jamaah al-Ikhwan al-Muslimin Indonesia (JAMI): a radical Islamic group

jihad: It is an Arabic word the root of which is Jahada, which means to strive for a better way of life. The nouns are Juhd, Mujahid, Jihad, and Ijtihad. The other meanings are: endeavor, strain, exertion, effort, diligence, fighting to defend one's life, land, and religion. According to moderate interpreters of Islam, *jihad* is not a war to force the faith

on others. There is an explicit verse in the Qur'an that says: "There is no compulsion in religion" Al-Qur'an: Al-Baqarah (2:256). Cited source: <http://www.usc.edu/dept/MSA/> (Muslim Student Association of University of Southern California)

jilbab: Islamic woman's head covering

Khariji (khawarij): "Khawarij" rebel. The phrase refers to the "exiters" who dissented from the followers of Ali at the end of the seventh century C.E. and promoted what has come to be regarded as a rebellious and ultra-egalitarian Islam unacceptable to the Sunni mainstream. (quoted from Hefner's paper)

Khilafah, khalifet: a Caliphate, a spiritual head and temporal ruler of the Islamic state who replaced the prophet Muhammad after his death.

KISDI: Indonesian Community for World Muslims Solidarity

Kitab Kuning: Yellow Book

KOPASSUS: Indonesian Army's Special Forces

KUI (Kongres Ulama Indonesia): Indonesian Congress of Ulamas

kyai: an Islamic scholar

Laskar Jihad: a militant Islamic group, part of the Front Komunikasi Ahlu-Sunnah Wal-Jama'ah group

Majelis Mujahidin Indonesia (MMI): a radical Islamic group

Majelis Ulama Indonesia: Indonesian Ulemas Council

Muhammadiyah: the second largest, moderate Muslim organization in Indonesia

munafik: adj. hypocrite

Nahdlatul Ulama: the largest, moderate Muslim organization in Indonesia

Naqshbandis: an order within the *Sufi* order

Nawawi al Bantani: one of the most prominent eighteenth century *alim* (a religious scholar). As a *Salafiyah* scholar his works were and are widely studied in Yemen, East Africa, Southeast India, the Maldives, Malaysia and Indonesia.

PAN (*Partai Amanat Nasional*): National Mandate Party

PBB (*Partai Bulan Bintang*): Crescent and Star Party

pesantren: Islamic theological school

PK (*Partai Keadilan*): Justice Party

PKB (*Partai Kebangkitan Bangsa*): National Awakening Party

PPP (*Partai Persatuan Pembangunan*): United Development Party

preman: hired thugs

Salaf, Salafi, Salafism: The type of Islam espoused by Osama bin Laden and his fellow extremists. Salafi Islam is closely connected to the Islamic Wahhabi movement. *Salafism*, derived from ‘*Salaf*’ or ‘ancestor’, is a purist movement that urges Muslims to shun the modern world and return to the austerity of the prophet’s times. According to Salafi Islam, a modern state is fundamentally incompatible with true Islam. Cited from: Fredholm, Michael. 2001. “Osama bin Laden and Salaf Islam: More Than a Mere Terrorist”. *The Analyst*, October 24.

Supi, Sufi, Sufism: an umbrella term for the ascetic and mystical movements within Islam. While Sufism is said to have incorporated elements of Christian monasticism, gnosticism, and Indian mysticism, its origins are traced to forms of devotion and groups of penitents (*zuhhad*) in the formative period of Islam. The word Sufi first appears in the eighth century, probably in connection with the coarse wool that many ascetics wore.

Sufi orders, which assimilated aspects of native religious traditions more readily than more dogmatic versions of Islam, played a major role in the expansion of Islam into sub-Saharan Africa and central, S, and SE Asia. Cited from: www.encyclopedia.com (online version of Columbia Encyclopedia, Sixth Edition)

syariah, shariah: Islamic Law

Wahhabi: reform movement in Islam, originating in Arabia. It was founded by Muhammad ibn Abd al-Wahab (c.1703-1791), who taught that all accretions to Islam after the 3d cent. of the Muslim era-i.e., after c.950-were spurious and must be expunged. This view, involving essentially a purification of the Sunni sect, regarded the veneration of saints, ostentation in worship, and luxurious living as the chief evils. Accordingly, Wahhabi mosques are simple and without minarets, and the adherents dress plainly and do not smoke tobacco or hashish. Driven from Medina for his preaching, the founder of the Wahhabi sect went into the NE Nejd and converted the Saudi tribe. The Saudi sheik, convinced that it was his religious mission to wage holy war (jihad) against all other forms of Islam, began the conquest of his neighbors in c.1763. By 1811 the Wahhabis ruled all Arabia, except Yemen, from their capital at Riyadh. The Ottoman sultan, nominally suzerain over Arabia, had vainly sent out expeditions to crush them. Only when the sultan called on Muhammad Ali of Egypt for aid did he meet success; by 1818 the Wahhabis were driven into the desert. In the Nejd they collected their power again and from 1821 to 1833 gained control over the Persian Gulf coast of Arabia. The domain thereafter steadily weakened; Riyadh was lost in 1884, and in 1889 the Saud family fled for refuge into the neighboring state of Kuwait. The Wahhabi movement was to enjoy its third triumph when Ibn Saud advanced from his capture of Riyadh in 1902 to the reconstitution in 1932 of nearly all his ancestral domain under the name Saudi Arabia, where Wahhabism remains dominant. Wahhabism served as an inspiration to other Islamic reform movements from India and Sumatra to North Africa and the Sudan. Cited from: www.encyclopedia.com (online version of Columbia Encyclopedia, Sixth Edition)

ulama: the learned, knowledgeable people in Islam

ummah, ummat: an ummah is a community or a people. It is used in reference to the community of Believers or Muslims.

BIOGRAPHICAL INFORMATION ON THE SPEAKERS

Ulil Abshar Abdalla, Executive Director, Indonesia Conference on Religion and Peace (ICRP)

In addition to his role as executive director for ICRP, Ulil is on the board of directors of Lakpesdam, the research, training, and community development institute of Nahdlatul Ulama, Indonesia's largest mass-based organization (with approximately 30 million members). He is also a founding member and head of "Liberal Islam," a print and electronic media network (funded by The Asia Foundation and USAID) working to promote civil society values of pluralism and tolerance within Indonesia's Muslim community. Ulil is widely recognized as a key leader in the rising generation of progressive Muslim intellectuals and activists.

Moeslim Abdurrahman, Muhammadiyah Board of Directors

Moeslim Abdurrahman is the director for Grassroots Empowerment for Muhammadiyah, Indonesia's second largest mass-based Islamic organization. He has extensive ties within Muhammadiyah and Indonesia's largest mass-based organization, Nahdlatul Ulama, and in Muslim communities and organizations throughout Indonesia and Southeast Asia. Moeslim received his primary education at a Muhammadiyah *pesantren* in rural East Java, and completed a Bachelors program at the Muhammadiyah Institute of Islamic Studies in Surakarta where he also taught at a *pesantren*. He holds MA and Ph.D. degrees in cultural anthropology from the University of Illinois, Urbana-Champaign.

Azyumardi Azra, Rector, State Institute for Islamic Studies (IAIN), Jakarta

As the rector of the State Islamic Institute (IAIN) Jakarta, Professor Azra has considerable influence on public opinion among Muslims in Indonesia. He holds a Ph.D. in history from Columbia University with a dissertation on the network of *ulama*, or religious scholars, in Southeast Asia and the Middle-East. He has written numerous books and articles on Islam in Indonesia, and is one of the leading authorities on the subject. Professor Azra has led an IAIN-based effort (supported by USAID and The Asia Foundation) to introduce civic education into higher education in Indonesia, stressing civil society values of democratic pluralism.

Donald K. Emmerson, Senior Fellow, Stanford University Asia/Pacific Research Center

Donald K. Emmerson is a senior fellow in Stanford University's Institute for International Studies, where he also heads the Asia/Pacific Research Center's Southeast Asia Forum. Until recently he was also a professor in the University of Wisconsin-Madison's Department of Political Science. At Stanford he is teaching a seminar entitled "Beyond Jihad: Indonesia in Global Perspective." He has written numerous articles and books on Indonesia including most recently, "Southeast Asia and the United States since 11 September," in the *Van Zorge Report* on Indonesia, and "Letter from America," in the *Tempo* October English language edition. Since September 11 he has traveled throughout the U.S. discussing Islam, Southeast Asia, U.S. policies and U.S.-Indonesia relations in the wake of the September 11 attacks. He received his Ph.D. in political science from Yale University and his BA in public and international affairs from Princeton.

Greg Fealy, Lecturer in Southeast Asian Politics and History, Australian National University

Greg Fealy is an internationally recognized expert on Islam in Indonesia. He holds a Ph.D. in Asian Studies and History from Monash University, and is editor and co-author of *Nahdlatul Ulama, Traditional Islam and Modernity in Indonesia*, the first English-language volume on traditionalist Islam in Indonesia, and the author of numerous studies on Indonesian politics, human rights, and Islam. He was Indonesia Analyst for the Office of National Assessments, Prime Minister's Department, Canberra, Australia and was formerly Research Fellow in Indonesian History at the Research School of Asian and Pacific Studies, Australian National University.

Robert Hefner, Professor and Assistant Director, Inst. of Economic Culture, Boston University

Robert W. Hefner is Professor of Anthropology and Associate Director of the Institute for the Study of Economic Culture, Boston University. He earned his Ph.D. from the University of Michigan, and has researched, lectured, and published widely on Javanese cultures, Islam, capitalism, and democracy in Indonesia. In addition to his latest book, *Civil Islam*, Dr. Hefner is the author of numerous books and articles on Islam and democratization in Indonesia. He is widely recognized as one of the leading scholars in the U.S. on Indonesian Islam.

Lies Marcoes Natsir, Researcher, Association for the Development of Pesantren and Society (P3M)

Lies Marcoes Natsir is a central figure in Indonesia's Islam-oriented women's movement, and is involved with numerous organizations working to promote gender equality in the Muslim community. She is a frequent contributor to the media and serves as a consultant on gender issues for organizations including the Ford Foundation, World Bank, The Asia Foundation, and AUSAID. She holds a Masters degree from Leiden University.

Douglas E. Ramage, Representative to Indonesia, The Asia Foundation

Douglas E. Ramage is The Asia Foundation's Representative to Indonesia, East Timor, and Malaysia where he directs the Foundation's civil society, democracy, and economic reform programs, managing an international staff of over 60 and \$8 million in technical assistance and grants to approximately 100 Indonesian organizations and government agencies. Prior to joining the Foundation in 1996, Dr. Ramage was a research fellow in Southeast Asian Politics at the East-West Center and visiting assistant professor at the University of Hawaii. He is the author of numerous works on Indonesian politics, with a focus on the relationship between Islam and democracy. Dr. Ramage holds a Ph.D. in international studies from the University of South Carolina.

Rizal Sukma, Director of Studies, Center for Strategic and International Studies (CSIS)

Rizal Sukma is director of studies at the Center for Strategic and International Studies (CSIS), Jakarta, and a member of the Central Board of Indonesia's Muhammadiyah where he is secretary of the International Relations Division. He received his MA and Ph.D. in International Relations from the London School of Economics and Political Science (LSE). Dr. Sukma has worked extensively on Chinese defense and foreign policy, Southeast Asian security issues, ASEAN cooperation, Indonesian foreign policy, and domestic political change in Indonesia. He is the author of numerous publications on Indonesia and foreign policy.

Mark Woodward, Associate Professor, Department of Religious Studies, Arizona State University

Mark Woodward is a prominent scholar on religion in Southeast Asia, with special interest in religion and modernization. He has authored numerous comparative religious studies and books on modern religion and ethnicity in Indonesia. He received his Ph.D. in anthropology from the University of Illinois in 1985 where his thesis research examined Islam and mysticism in Central Java.